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TablesForeword
The people operating small farms in developing countries have to cope with the risks of these small 
businesses and have long faced heavy challenges. Today, these challenges are particularly severe, 
and the aspirations of young people on small farms have changed. Globalization and the integration 
of international markets are stimulating intense competition, offering some opportunities but also new 
risks. In light of these pressures and others, many of the world’s millions of small farmers are simply not 
making it. Indeed, half of the world’s undernourished people, three-quarters of Africa’s malnourished 
children, and the majority of people living in absolute poverty live on small farms.
The transformation of the small-farm economy is one of the biggest economic challenges of our 
time. For some, it entails growth into specialized, market-oriented farms; for others, part-time farming 
combined with off-farm rural jobs; and for others, a move out of agriculture. The pathways of transfor-
mation differ by region and location and will take decades. Policy must take a long-run view to support 
and guide this process efficiently, effectively, and in social fairness. The role of women farmers and their 
livelihoods requires particular attention.
In this paper, Peter Hazell, Colin Poulton, Steve Wiggins, and Andrew Dorward address several 
crucial questions. Do small farms in fact have a future? In what situations can small farms succeed? 
What strategies are most appropriate for helping to raise small-farm productivity? The authors review 
both sides of the debate over the future of small farms before coming to their conclusions. Coming 
down firmly on the side of policy support for small farms, they point to small farms’ significant potential 
for reducing poverty and inequity. They also clarify the differing roles of and needs for small farms in 
different country contexts and spell out a policy agenda for promoting small-farm development.
This discussion paper is based on a literature review and the deliberations of an international work-
shop, “The Future of Small Farms,” organized by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
2020 Vision Initiative, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and Imperial College London in Wye, 
England, from June 26 to 29, 2005. (A proceedings volume for this workshop is available from IFPRI, 
www.ifpri.org/events/seminars/2005/smallfarms/sfproc.asp.)
We hope that this discussion paper will help stimulate renewed attention among many stakehold-
ers—including policymakers, researchers, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations—to 
small-scale agricultural development. Healthy and productive small farms could serve as a crucial 
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AcknowledgmentsThe Role of Agriculture
1
The case for rural development is easy to make: the large majority of the poor live in the rural areas of 
the developing world. Even with urbanization, this reality will not change for at least another 20 years. 
Although some of the rural poor may be helped by transfers from cities, for most poor households any 
improvement in their incomes will depend on generating more and better jobs in rural areas.
Agriculture is likely to be central to rural development and rural poverty alleviation. Farming has 
high potential to create jobs, to increase returns to the assets that the poor possess—their labor and 
in some cases their land—and to push down the price of food staples, which is crucial when so many 
of the poor are net buyers of food. Historically, few countries have industrialized successfully without 
prior development of their agriculture. Recent comparisons made across countries show that increases 
in agricultural productivity are closely related to poverty reduction. In most rural areas, moreover, there 
are few alternatives to farming as a large-scale source of jobs. The opportunities for mining and tourism 
are restricted to locations with mineral deposits or natural assets, and rural manufacturers find it difficult 
to compete with urban factories. 
Nevertheless, some changes in the past quarter century make agricultural development more difficult 
than before. The prices of most commodities have fallen on world markets. The better opportunities for 
Green Revolution–type packages of improved seeds and fertilizer have already been taken up, and 
there are doubts about the ability of research to provide major technical advances. In some areas soil 
fertility has been lost, water tables are falling, and climate change may mean increasingly adverse 
weather. Parts of Africa face significant impacts from the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Finally, current policy 
preferences prevent the state from taking as active a role in fostering agricultural development as it did 
in the past.
How much these changes hinder agricultural development varies by context. This paper considers 
different country situations, based on the prospects for minerals, manufacturing, and agriculture. In most 
cases, agriculture proves central to development efforts, either as a leading sector or as a supporter 
to other sectors.
The Case for and against Small Farms
Should agricultural development efforts emphasize small or large farms? In terms of efficiency, small 
farms typically make intensive use of land by using much labor, since the costs of supervising household 
labor are low. Self-provisioning saves costs of marketing. Large farms, on the other hand, have lower 




1 This executive summary is also available as 2020 Policy Brief 75, published under the same title as this discussion paper.With regard to equity and poverty reduction, small farms are preferred to large. Smallholdings 
are typically operated by poor people who use a great deal of labor, both from their own households 
and from their equally poor or poorer neighbors. Moreover, when small-farm households spend their 
incomes, they tend to spend them on locally produced goods and services, thereby stimulating the rural 
nonfarm economy and creating additional jobs. 
The changes already described affect both small and large farms, and more or less equally. But 
other  developments  may  pose  more  severe  challenges  for  smallholdings.  When  new  technologies 
require  more  capital  inputs,  mechanization,  or  high  levels  of  education,  these  requirements  may 
disadvantage smaller farms.
More worrying are the implications of changes to marketing chains. Supermarket operators are 
becoming increasingly important in parts of the developing world. The supermarkets impose stricter 
standards for the quality, consistency, and timeliness of supply. They may also require the ability to 
trace consignments back to the source to confirm how they have been produced. Supermarkets expect 
their suppliers to adjust rapidly to changing consumer demands. Small-scale, undercapitalized, and 
often undereducated farmers find it particularly difficult to meet these requirements, especially those of 
traceability and credence (that is, characteristics that relate to production methods like pesticide use 
but cannot be proved by examining the produce), even if family labor is often well suited to delivering 
high-quality products.
Will small farms be marginalized from the new supply chains? Much depends on whether they 
grow produce where credence attributes matter and whether supermarkets can obtain their supplies 
from large farms. When supermarkets can deal with a few large farms, they will; when credence 
attributes are less important or there are no alternatives to small farms, then smallholders are likely 
to become part of the evolving supply chains. Equally important is how quickly supermarkets come 
to dominate food supply chains. Supermarkets thrive in growing economies, so as their control of 
marketing increases and some small farmers are excluded, chances are that new jobs are being created 
for them in nonfarm activities.
The Policy Agenda for Small Farms
What are the policy implications? Policies for smallholders need to vary by context. In some cases, and 
for some small farms, smallholder development promises both to drive or sustain growth and to deliver 
reasonably equitable development. In other cases, policymakers need to consider whether there are 
social reasons to support small farms. If not, the policy agenda involves establishing social safety nets 
for the poor and facilitating good exits from farming for small farmers.
A contemporary agenda for smallholder development to promote growth and equity would have 
three central elements, as follows.
One  is  getting  the  basics  in  place.  These  basics  include  ensuring  that  the  macroeconomy  is 
stable and that public goods—rural roads, rural education and health care, agricultural research and 
extension—are funded by the state. The basics also include good governance for agricultural and rural 
development: ensuring the rule of law in the countryside; providing opportunities for resolving disputes, 
especially over land; and making any public interventions in food and credit markets as transparent 
and predictable as possible.
A second element is encouraging farmers to follow demand and improving marketing systems. 
Improving marketing systems so that farmers receive a greater share of market prices may involve 
upgrading transport infrastructure and systems, providing credit to traders and processors, and forming 
farmer associations for bulk marketing.
There are also questions about how to respond to high variability of market prices, both between 
viiiseasons and across the years. Some people argue that price variability requires public intervention in 
markets, but others argue for improvements to private marketing systems through, for example, incentives 
to invest in storage.
The third element is institutional innovation in providing inputs and services. As experience over 
the past two decades has shown only too clearly, markets however much liberalized often fail in rural 
areas. Critical problems are lack of information on the intentions and character of small farmers and 
the difficulty of overcoming complementary coordination problems in the delivery of input, financial, 
technical, and output marketing services needed for small-farm intensification. Institutional innovations 
are needed to overcome these failures, but who will take the initiative? In certain circumstances, the 
private sector has adequate incentives to innovate. In many cases, however, the state has a key role to 
play in coordination. Yet state agencies may be unfamiliar with this role and ill equipped to perform 
it, and they may lack the necessary incentives. Greater engagement with, and accountability to, other 
stakeholders (like private companies, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and farmer associations) 
can create incentives. Even in the best cases, however, one should not expect a completely smooth ride, 
because new roles take time to learn, old habits and mistrust persist, and some institutional experiments 
work better than others.
Even in situations where the agenda described is appropriate, it may not be carried out. Successful 
intervention on behalf of small farm–led agricultural development requires that governments have an 
interest in mobilizing the support needed and the capacity to do so. Political will is a fundamental precon-
dition for agricultural investment and policy reform, and it has been lacking in many of today’s poorest 
countries, particularly in Africa. Even Asian countries that have consistently shown strong political commit-
ment to small farm–led agricultural development now face major political economy challenges to cutting 
back subsidy support to agriculture in the Green Revolution heartlands and redirecting some of those 
resources to investments in public goods that can expand future small farm opportunities. Vested interests 
and widespread opposition in rural areas, among large farmers and the fertilizer and seed industries, 
have become major impediments to adapting the policy agenda to changing economic conditions.
African countries have produced much more government rhetoric about agricultural development 
over the years than actual commitment, but a number of changes to the development agenda have the 
potential to produce concrete results. These changes include increased emphasis on democratization, 
decentralization, and participatory policy processes (for example, poverty reduction strategy papers 
[PRSPs]). The impact of these changes on the orientation of agricultural policy (pro– or anti–small farms) 
is as yet unproven, but there may be opportunities to be seized.
Conclusions
The case for smallholder development as one of the main ways to reduce poverty remains compelling, 
at least to these authors. The policy agenda, however, must change to meet the new challenges facing 
small farms. The challenge is to improve the workings of markets for outputs, inputs, and financial 
services to overcome market failures. Meeting this challenge calls for innovations in institutions, for 
joint work between farmers, private companies, and NGOs, and for a new, more facilitating role for 
ministries of agriculture and other public agencies. New thinking on the role of the state in agricultural 
development and new opportunities to build on democratization, decentralization, and the introduction 
of participatory policy processes, plus a renewed interest in agriculture among major international 
donors, give grounds for hope that greater support can be delivered to enable small farm development. 
But unless key policymakers adopt a more assertive agenda toward small-farm agriculture, there is a 
growing risk that rural poverty will rise dramatically and that waves of migrants to urban areas will 
overwhelm available job opportunities, urban infrastructure, and support services.
ixOf the developing world’s 3 billion rural people, 
more than two-thirds reside on small farms (less 
than 2 hectares), of which there are nearly 500 
million (see Box 1 for a definition of small farms). 
These  small  farmers  include  half  of  the  world’s 
undernourished  people,  three-quarters  of  Africa’s 
malnourished children, and the majority of people 
living in absolute poverty (IFPRI 2005). Moreover, 
1. Introduction
1
Box 1—What do we mean by “small farms”?
Definitions of small farms vary. The most obvious measure is farm size, and several sources define small 
farms as those with less than 2 hectares of cropland. In a similar but less precise vein, others describe 
small farms as those with “limited resources,” a definition that includes land as well as capital, skills, 
and labor. 
  Other authors emphasize, variously:
• the low technology often used on small farms, 
• dependence on household members for most of the labor, and 
• subsistence orientation, where the primary aim of the farm is to produce the bulk of the household’s 
consumption of staple foods. 
  Context matters as well: a 10-hectare farm in many parts of Latin America would be smaller than 
the national average, operated largely by family labor, and producing primarily for subsistence⎯making 
it a small farm by most criteria. The same-sized holding in the irrigated lands of West Bengal, on the 
other hand, would be well above the average size for the region, would probably hire in much of the 
labor used, and would produce a significant surplus for sale. In this case, the 10-hectare farm would 
be described as medium, if not large, and probably be seen as “commercial” as well.
  Some of the debate on small farms is confused by the proponents having in mind different kinds of 
small farms. Those optimistic about the prospects for smallholder development have in mind small farms 
that are large enough to provide one or more full-time jobs for the household and capable of generating 
enough income—albeit in combination with some off-farm work, especially in the slack season for 
farming—to escape poverty. How large is “large enough” in this case? The answer might be as little as 
1 hectare for irrigated land, and as much as 3 hectares for rainfed cropland. 
  Other observers have in mind that many small farms are smaller than these sizes and are incapable 
of providing enough work or income to be the main livelihood of the household. These are perhaps 
better termed “marginal farms,” a term in standard use in India for holdings of less than 1 hectare. 
  Very small or marginal farms in some countries make up the majority of all holdings—in India, for 
example, farms of less than 1 hectare comprise 62 percent of all holdings and occupy 17 percent of 
farmed land. 
  Development  strategies  for  these  different  kinds  of  small  farms  may  be  rather  different,  with 
correspondingly different policy implications—a point that will be taken up in Chapter 2 of this paper.
Source for definitions: Nagayets 2005.despite recurring predictions that small farms will 
soon  disappear,  they  have  proved  remarkably 
persistent.  Indeed,  the  area  operated  in  small 
farms in the developing world appears to be rising 
rather than falling, and average farm size declined 
in large parts of the developing world during the 
second half of the 20th century (Figure 1). Although 
for many small farms the importance of farming in 
household income has declined, the number of rural 
households who use farming as a platform for their 
livelihood strategies continues to grow. 
Agricultural growth that improves productivity 
on small farms has proven to be highly effective 
in slashing poverty and hunger and raising rural 
living standards, as demonstrated in large parts 
of Asia during the Green Revolution. Moreover, 
most of the countries that have failed to launch 
an  agricultural  revolution  remain  trapped  in 
poverty, hunger, and economic stagnation. But the 
conventional conclusion that developing countries 
should  continue  to  invest  in  their  agricultural 
development, and in small farms in particular, is 
being challenged.
The challenge begins with the role of agriculture 
itself. Agriculture has become a relatively minor 
sector in many successfully transforming countries 
and is now seen as less important for growth and 
employment  creation  than  other  more  rapidly 
growing  sectors.  Moreover,  globalization  has 
led  to  an  explosion  in  international  agricultural 
trade, reducing prices and increasing competition 
in agriculture around the world, making it more 
difficult  for  farmers  in  countries  with  poorly 
developed  agricultural  sectors  to  compete  in 
either their traditional export markets or their own 
domestic markets for food and feed.
Even in countries where good prospects for 
agricultural  growth  remain,  it  may  no  longer 
be  the  case  that  small  farms  have  a  promising 
future.  In  successfully  growing  countries,  many 
small-scale farms disappear as their workers are 
attracted to higher-paying opportunities in other 
more  rapidly  growing  sectors  of  the  economy, 
and  farms  become  fewer  and  larger.  History 
shows that this exit pattern contributes to national 
economic  growth  and  helps  avoid  widening 
2
Figure 1—Mean farm size by continent, 1930–1990















































income gaps between rural and urban areas. But 
part of today’s global challenge arises because 
this transition must happen on an unprecedented 
scale and with unprecedented speed. More than 
2  billion  people  live  in  developing  countries 
whose  per  capita  incomes  are  doubling  every 
10–15 years, a situation that leads to enormous 
pressure  for  millions  of  small  farms  to  find  exit 
strategies. Rapid growth in nonfarm employment 
opportunities  is  required—perhaps  more  than 
most countries can hope to generate or than can 
be handled without serious social dislocations and 
environmental degradation.
But this is only part of the threat to small farms 
today. New driving forces pose serious challenges 
to  the  viability  of  small-scale  farming,  even  in 
countries that are not growing rapidly. These forces 
include falling prices for most of the agricultural 
commodities that small farmers grow, especially 
food staples; the scourge of HIV/AIDS; mounting 
pressure  on  natural  resources  from  population 
growth; intensified international competition; and 
the vigorous entry of supermarket chains into some 
developing-country  markets  where  they  make 
new demands on potential suppliers for quality, 
consistency, and timeliness.
Just  how  serious  are  these  threats  to  small 
farms? Under what conditions can small farmers 
seize new opportunities in the context of changing 
markets? How can small farms provide the basis 
for rural livelihoods that generate incomes above 
the poverty line, with little risk of slipping back into 
poverty? And for small farmers who cannot climb 
out of poverty, what alternative opportunities can 
be created? What policy interventions are needed 
to help manage the transition to fewer and larger 
farms while avoiding worsening poverty and social 
inequalities at regional and household levels? 4
Small  farms  are  important  players  in  most 
developing  countries,  accounting  for  significant 
shares  of  agricultural  output  and  national 
employment,  and  thus  their  future  is  linked  to 
future  possibilities  for  the  agricultural  sector. 
This  role  is  itself  currently  an  issue  of  some 
debate, and so we begin with an assessment of 
the agricultural context in which the small farm 
debate must be resolved.
Contending Views
The historical record shows that other than a few 
city or island states, almost no country has ever 
achieved  rapid  economic  growth  at  the  early 
stages of development without substantial growth 
of its agriculture. As the impacts of globalization 
and trade liberalization are felt around the world, 
however, and as many countries have grown out 
of  low-income  status,  there  is  a  growing  sense 
that  the  role  of  agriculture  must  also  change 
and  that  this  need  for  change  has  important 
implications for agricultural development strategy. 
Key arguments made for and against agriculture 
are summarized in Table 1.
Some  of  the  differences  in  this  debate  can 
be resolved by recognizing that there is no single 
role for agriculture, and country context in terms of 
access to international markets, natural resources, 
and  stage  of  development  plays  an  important 
role in defining opportunities and constraints and 
hence roles for the agricultural sector. Context is 
also important in determining whether agricultural 
growth will be pro-poor or not.
Stage of Development
Agriculture dominates the economy of most poor 
countries and historically has played an important 
role  in  launching  an  economic  transformation. 
But its role changes with a country’s economic 
transformation, particularly as national per capita 
income  grows.  This  transformation  has  several 
important  implications  for  agriculture  and  the 
rural economy:
•  Agriculture’s  shares  in  national  income  and 
employment  fall  sharply  as  countries  grow 
richer and diversify, even though agricultural 
output and employment typically keep growing 
until  quite  late  in  the  development  process. 
This process means that agriculture becomes 
progressively  less  important  for  driving 
growth in national income and employment 
and  that  the  baton  passes  to  other  more 
rapidly  growing  sectors  like  manufacturing 
and services. 
•  As per capita incomes rise, labor becomes 
more expensive relative to land and capital 
and small farms begin to get squeezed out 
by larger and more capitalized farms that can 
capture growing economies of scale. There is 
an exodus of agricultural workers. 
•  As  per  capita  incomes  rise,  consumers 
diversify their diets and demand higher-value 
livestock  products,  fruits  and  vegetables, 
and relatively fewer food staples. They also 
demand  higher-quality  products  and  more 
processed and precooked foods. Urbanization 
accentuates these patterns and also places a 
high  premium  on  market  access,  especially 
for perishable products (Pingali, Khwaja, and 
Meijer 2005). 
As a result of these changes, farms become 
larger, more commercial, and more specialized 
in  higher-value  products.  Many  small  farms 
disappear, while others adapt either by farmers 
specializing  in  high-value  niches  in  which  they 
can compete or by becoming part-time farmers.
2. The Role of Agriculture5
Table 1—Summary of the debate about the role of agriculture
Type of argument Case for agriculture Case against agriculture
Engine of growth  
Alternatives to agriculture   
Technical feasibility  
 
Poverty impact 
Policy environment   
Agriculture is a large enough 
sector in many countries that its 
growth can make a real difference 
to rural living standards. Moreover, 
agriculture has powerful growth 
linkage effects on the rest of the 
economy, including providing a 
growing demand for nascent indus-
tries. 
Many poor countries do not have 
viable alternatives to agriculture. 
Their manufacturing sectors are 
small and internationally uncom-
petitive, and their service sectors 
are demand constrained. 
Modern science is opening up new 
opportunities to increase agricul-
tural productivity, even in countries 
and regions that have not ben-
efited much from new technologies 
in the past. 
Agricultural growth has proven 
to be powerfully pro-poor when 
based on small farms and the 
products they grow, especially 
food staples.
Structural adjustment programs 
have removed the worst of the 
biases against agriculture and 
opened the way for more success-
ful agricultural investments. 
Agriculture has become a relatively small 
sector in successfully growing countries, and 
other faster-growing sectors should now be 
prioritized. In many poor countries where 
agriculture still dominates, its low productivity 
and unfavorable market prospects undermine 
its potential. Moreover, agriculture’s growth 
linkages are weaker in today’s liberalized 
economies and may not be any larger than 
the linkages associated with employment-inten-
sive manufacturing and services.
Trade liberalization and foreign direct invest-
ment have opened up new opportunities for 
developing countries to become early export-
ers of manufactures and some services and to 
rely more on low-cost food imports.
The best technological opportunities have 
already been exploited, and agricultural 
research now faces diminishing returns in 
the better agricultural areas and costly and 
risky prospects in lagging regions. Modern 
intensive farming also leads to environmen-
tal degradation in many developing-country 
situations. A shift toward private funding of 
research means that the problems of poor 
farmers are less likely to be a priority.
Changes in market systems mean that there 
are limited market opportunities for small 
farms today, and the prices of the products 
they grow are at historic lows. The combina-
tion of lower prices and smaller farm sizes 
reduces the direct poverty impact of agricul-
tural intensification. The rural poor have also 
diversified away from agriculture as their 
main source of livelihood. Commercial farms 
and high-value market chains offer better pros-
pects for creating employment and reducing 
poverty. 
There is no tolerance today for the kinds of 
big public spending on agriculture, includ-
ing subsidies, that characterized the Green 
Revolution and that some think are needed 
in Africa today. Many countries also lack the 
governance and administrative capability to 
implement ambitious agricultural development 
programs.6
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agricultural opportunities 
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Seen  in  this  dynamic  context,  arguments 
against  prioritizing  small-farm  agriculture  and 
food staples make sense once the transformation 
of a country is well underway, and the focus should 
shift  to  larger  farms  and  high-value  products. 
Opportunities  for  small  farms  and  agricultural 
workers  to  leave  agriculture  also  increase 
with  economic  growth,  but  not  necessarily  fast 
enough to prevent widening income gaps. Policy 
attention must then shift to managing their exit. 
Location and Resource Endowments
Agriculture generally plays its largest role in the 
early  stages  of  development,  but  its  potential 
contributions  to  economic  growth  and  poverty 
reduction  are  affected  by  a  country’s  resource 
endowments  and  its  access  to  international 
markets.  Table  2  summarizes  many  accepted 
perceptions  of  agriculture’s  roles  during  the 
early  stages  of  the  economic  transformation, 
differentiated by country context.
Countries  with  mineral  resources  may  have 
the opportunity to earn significant export revenues 7
and  government  income  without  agricultural 
development.  In  practice,  minerals  have  proved 
a curse for many poor countries, benefiting just a 
small segment of the population and contributing 
to corruption and conflict while leading to a high 
currency  exchange  rate  that  penalizes  tradable 
sectors like agriculture (the Dutch disease problem). 
The potential role of agriculture in such countries 
depends on its productivity potential, the size of 
the mineral revenues, and how they are managed. 
On the one hand, where productivity potential is 
good, it may be possible to invest mineral revenues 
in roads, irrigation and drainage, research, and 
extension  to  promote  a  competitive  farm  sector 
despite high exchange rates. A good example is 
Indonesia, where oil earnings allowed heavy public 
investment in agricultural and rural development. 
On the other hand, where agricultural productivity 
potential is poor, agriculture will remain extensive, 
functioning as a subsistence reserve for those on 
the land, unless intensification is aided by heavy 
subsidies  that  may  be  affordable  if  the  mineral 
economy is sufficiently prosperous (as in Norway 
and some of the Gulf States). The benefits to the 
poor will be greater given an equitable (unimodal) 
distribution of land. 
Some  countries  that  are  favorably  located 
(such as on a coast) and have good access to 
international markets at low cost may have good 
prospects  for  developing  urban-based,  export-
oriented industries at an early stage. Unless these 
industries are to be limited to entrepôt activity, 
then  it  is  likely  that  agriculture  will  play  an 
important part in their development. Agriculture 
will  probably  be  an  important  initial  source  of 
capital and foreign exchange, and most of the 
needed labor will have to come from agriculture. 
Moreover, the early stages of manufacturing may 
be based on processing farm production. 
In  countries  with  low  agricultural  potential, 
agriculture  will  inevitably  play  a  smaller  role, 
particularly  if  there  are  minerals  or  potential 
for  export  manufacturing  or  tourism.  The  most 
challenging  cases  are  countries  with  low 
agricultural  potential,  no  minerals,  and  limited 
prospects for alternative growth sectors. Agriculture 
in these countries is likely to be first and foremost 
a subsistence reserve where the poor can build 
livelihoods  with  little  dependency  on  the  state, 
particularly  when  land  is  distributed  equitably. 
That  is  not  to  say  that  there  will  not  be  some 
farming that is competitive, at least on the domestic 
market. Even countries where the land resources 
are  generally  poor  for  farming  contain  some 
pockets of land with reasonable soil and a water 
supply.  Prominent  examples  here  are  Sahelian 
countries  that  have  established  themselves  as 
major cotton exporters in the past two decades, 
and have developed a modest level of irrigated 
rice production.
Poverty Outcomes
In  situations  with  an  equitable  (unimodal) 
distribution of land, agricultural growth can be 
powerfully pro-poor. It not only raises small-farm 
incomes and employment, but also contributes to 
lower food prices and generates strong growth 
linkages in the nonfarm economy, which in turn 
help the poor. This role is greater in countries with 
good agricultural productivity potential.
Asia’s  Green  Revolution  demonstrated  how 
agricultural growth that reaches large numbers of 
small farms could transform rural economies and 
raise enormous numbers of people out of poverty 
(Rosegrant and Hazell 2000). Recent studies also 
show that a more egalitarian distribution of land 
not only leads to higher economic growth, but 
also helps ensure that the growth that is achieved 
is more beneficial to the poor (see, for example, 
Deininger and Squire 1998; Ravallion and Datt 
2002).2 
In  contrast,  agricultural  growth  has  proven 
2 There is a large econometric literature that uses cross-country or time series data to estimate growth-poverty elasticities by 
sector. These studies generally find high poverty reduction elasticities for agricultural productivity growth, especially in the 
early stages of development and relative to other sectors. For example, Thirtle, Lin, and Piesse (2002) in a cross-country study 
estimate that a 1 percent increase in crop productivity reduces the number of poor people by 0.72 percent in Africa and by 
0.48 percent in Asia. In India, Ravallion and Datt (1996) estimated the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to agricultural 
value added per hectare at 0.4 percent in the short run and 1.9 percent in the long run, the latter through the indirect effects 
of lower food prices and higher wages.much less pro-poor in countries that began with 
an  inequitable  distribution  of  land  (bimodal). 
Good  examples  of  this  case  can  be  seen  in 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, and many parts of Latin 
America. 
The Impact of Globalization
In summary, agriculture’s past roles have included 
those  of  leading  growth  sector  in  countries 
with  good  agricultural  potential,  especially  if 
there  are  limited  alternatives;  important  sector 
for  spreading  the  benefits  of  minerals  to  a 
broad  rural  base;  and  a  subsistence  base  for 
many of the poor until they can find alternative 
livelihoods. These roles are context specific, and 
understanding  these  relationships  helps  resolve 
part of the contemporary debate about the future 
role of agriculture. 
Contention  remains,  however,  about  how 
globalization  is  affecting  these  different  roles. 
Rapid growth in international agricultural trade, 
low  world  prices,  and  increasing  competition 
in  agriculture  around  the  world  are  making 
it  more  difficult  for  farmers  in  countries  with 
poorly developed agricultural sectors to compete. 
The  pressure  on  developing-country  farmers  is 
exacerbated by the hefty subsidies that farmers 
receive  in  most  countries  of  the  Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD).3 In this environment, some experts ask if 
it is realistic to continue to prioritize agriculture in 
poor countries (Maxwell, Urey, and Ashley 2001; 
Ellis and Harris 2004). This question is especially 
important  for  countries  in  the  early  stages  of 
development that do not have sufficient minerals 
or  initial  manufacturing  potential  to  provide 
alternative engines of growth of the scale required 
to launch an economic transformation. Much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa falls in this category. 
The  debate  centers  on  four  reasons  for  no 
longer  prioritizing  agriculture  in  poor  countries 
(see also Table 1).
First,  in  many  poor  countries  (especially 
in  Africa),  the  agricultural  sector  has  fallen  so 
far behind the rest of the world in terms of its 
productivity  that  it  would  be  very  difficult  and 
expensive to bring it up to levels at which it could 
compete  in  the  market  at  today’s  low  prices. 
Countries might better take advantage of trade 
liberalization and private sector capital flows (via 
foreign direct investment, or FDI) to develop new 
industries and rely on food imports as needed. 
Second,  the  growth  linkages  emanating 
from  agricultural  growth  are  much  weaker  in 
today’s  more  open  economies,  especially  in 
small countries. For example, when imports can 
enter freely, food prices will be determined more 
by  border  prices  than  by  domestic  agricultural 
production,  and  industry  can  sell  directly  into 
foreign markets without having to wait for growth 
in domestic demand. 
Third, the rural poor have diversified away 
from agriculture, making agricultural growth less 
important for poverty reduction. 
Finally,  there  is  no  tolerance  today  for  the 
kinds  of  big  public  spending  on  agriculture, 
including subsidies, that characterized the Green 
Revolution  and  that  some  think  are  needed 
in  Africa  today.  Many  countries  also  lack  the 
governance  and  administrative  capability  to 
implement  ambitious  agricultural  development 
programs.
Agricultural development may be difficult and 
growing more so, but this does not necessarily 
imply  that  other  sectors  offer  easier  options. 
At a time when countries like China and India 
are  flooding  world  markets  with  cheap  goods, 
launching  manufacturing-based  industries  for 
export is also challenging, especially for countries 
that  do  not  have  easy  access  to  markets,  face 
high transport costs, or cannot attract much FDI. 
For  many  poor  countries,  especially  in  Africa, 
there  may  simply  be  no  alternative  to  farming 
as  an  activity  capable  of  creating  jobs  and 
raising  the  incomes  of  the  poor  on  the  scale 
required. This point is made by Fafchamps, Teal, 
and  Toye  (2001).  Reviewing  the  prospects  for 
economic growth in Africa, these authors favor 
manufacturing,  owing  to  its  record  of  potential 
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3 The World Bank (2002) estimated their total value at about US$330 billion per year.growth of as much as 10 percent a year, when 
agriculture  rarely  grows  at  more  than  half  that 
rate. But they recognize that only a few countries 
in  Africa  have  the  conditions  to  allow  rapid 
growth of manufacturing on a substantial scale in 
the short term. 
Others  place  greater  hope  in  the  service 
sector, which is growing rapidly in many countries, 
including in Africa. Yet the service sector depends 
largely on the domestic market for its demand, 
and  unless  per  capita  incomes  are  increasing, 
demand will remain stagnant. Where this is the 
case, as in many African countries, new service 
sector  jobs  are  likely  to  be  low-productivity 
activities  that  simply  supplement,  rather  than 
replace,  existing  incomes—what  Lipton  (2004) 
calls “jobs of distress.” The better jobs are often 
driven  by  government  employment  (including 
the  military)  and  by  services  directly  linked  to 
foreign aid (such as services for expatriates and 
project  activities).  Unless  Africa  can  generate 
rapid  growth  in  service  sector  exports  (in,  for 
example,  information  technology  or  tourism), 
then  the  longer-term  prospects  for  the  service 
sector ultimately depend on alternative engines 
of  growth  like  agriculture  to  increase  domestic 
demand.
There are also important questions about the 
costs of not developing agriculture. If agricultural 
development is bypassed in favor of other sectors, 
it may mean that food and raw materials are only 
available at a high cost, thus increasing the costs 
of industry and other activities. Although it may 
be argued that in a world with more open trading 
regimes,  most  countries  can  import  sufficient 
supplies of agricultural output if necessary, this 
will not be the case for three important groups of 
poor countries:
1.  the half dozen or so most populous countries 
(home  to  the  majority  of  the  world’s  poor) 
whose  total  food  needs  dwarf  world  trade 
volumes—even  relatively  modest  production 
shortfalls in these countries could lead to large 
increases in world prices;
2.  landlocked  countries  that  face  high  transport 
costs; and
3.  countries with low foreign exchange earnings 
that can ill afford to divert these earnings away 
from  essential  imports  and  capital  goods  to 
foods that could be grown at home.
Moreover, to ignore the agricultural sector in 
the absence of other opportunities is to condemn 
the rural majority to poverty. The result may then 
be  heavy  expenditure  on  welfare  programs: 
protection of the very poor and destitute in rural 
areas  can  be  an  expensive  business.  Ignoring 
agriculture may also fail to utilize and develop 
human and other resources in rural areas. It may 
invite  political  instability.  Historically,  countries 
that  have  marginalized  large  sections  of  their 
rural  populations  have  had  to  contend  with 
enduring social inequalities and political tensions 
that  few  nations  would  choose  to  have.  South 
Africa would be a good example, as would most 
Latin American countries, with the exceptions of 
Costa Rica, Cuba, and possibly Mexico. 
  The  costs  and  difficulties  of  agricultural 
development  may  be  more  difficult  than  in  the 
past, but they are not necessarily overwhelming. 
Modern science is opening up new opportunities 
to  increase  agricultural  productivity,  even  in 
countries and regions that have not benefited much 
from new technologies in the past. Developments 
in information technology and energy generation 
can also overcome some of the constraints of poor 
infrastructure. As a result of structural adjustment 
programs  and  liberalization  of  agricultural 
markets,  many  countries  have  also  created  a 
more enabling environment in which the private 
sector and civil society can play a greater role 
in agricultural development, reducing the burden 
on the state. The difficulties are also affected by 
the  kind  of  agricultural  development  pursued, 
particularly  whether  small  farms  and  the  rural 
poor are to be at the core of the strategy, and the 
kinds of political support that can be marshalled. 
We  return  to  these  issues  after  reviewing  the 
small-farm debate.
9Advantages of Small Farms
Agriculture may play a central role in develop-
ment, but this does not necessarily imply that 
small farms should have an equally central role. 
What, then, are the arguments for basing agri-
cultural development on smaller farms? Two prin-
cipal considerations arise, one a matter of effi-
ciency, the other concerning equity and poverty. 
Efficiency
The efficiency argument for small-scale agricul-
ture is based upon an extensive and long-stand-
ing empirical literature that has investigated 
the inverse relationship between farm size and 
production per unit of land. This literature shows 
a common tendency for larger farms to yield 
lower gross and net returns per hectare of land 
per year than smaller farms. These results are 
generally strongest in Asia, where land is scarce 
compared with labor.4 
The  causes  of  the  implied  diseconomies  of 
scale are summarized by Lipton (2005b) as fol-
lows: Economies of scale in agriculture may apply 
in input supply, processing of harvests, and trans-
port, but for most farm operations, economies of 
scale  are  weak,  and  there  may  well  be  disec-
onomies that apply once production exceeds the 
scope and capacity of the family farm.5 But the 
balance of these two opposing forces lies with 
smallness, at least in the developing world. 
In  other  words,  scale  of  farming  leads  to 
different transaction costs for different operations. 
Poulton, Dorward, and Kydd (2005) summarize 
the  differing  cost  advantages,  as  shown  in   
Table 3. The implication is that when labor costs 
are an important part of agricultural costs, small 
farms  may  have  significant  advantages  over 
larger units. Conversely, once agriculture becomes 
more  intensive  in  transactions  beyond  the  farm 
gate—buying substantial quantities of inputs and 
selling most of the output—larger farms may have 
the advantage. Thus small farms have the edge 
for less technologically advanced agriculture with 
low  labor  costs,  but  as  an  economy  develops   
and  wages  and  the  use  of  capital  intensive 
technology increase, then the advantage shifts to 
larger farms.6 
3. The Case for and against Small Farms
10
4 The evidence for the inverse relationship (IR) is not undisputed. There are particular difficulties with definitions of farm size and 
with measures of productivity. Where studies have tried, however, to refine definitions of size and productivity (for example, 
looking at size in terms of land area per worker and at differences in productivity per hectare with an adjustment for land 
quality), the IR has often been strengthened (Lipton 1993).
5 The commonly cited cases apply to the quality of labor input, which in turn can be a major contributory factor toward the 
quality of the final product. Household members working on the farm have the motivation to work diligently and flexibly. This 
is a particular advantage with farm work, since so many operations require care and attention and a willingness to adapt 
quickly to changing conditions. In comparison, factory work is less demanding since much of the quality of work is defined by 
the machinery. On a larger-scale farm, the costs of supervising and coordinating labor rapidly escalate.
6 Small farms’ more efficient use of labor arises as a result of lower transaction costs, and some of these lower costs, relating 
to greater self-motivation and lower supervision costs, arise as a result of the low opportunity costs of labor for poor farmers 
and hence their “self-exploitation” (Dyer 1991, 1996). Under such circumstances marginal returns to labor may be lower than 
on large farms, though total unskilled employment and labor earnings should be higher. 11
Table 3—Transaction cost advantages of small and large farms
Transaction Small-farm advantage Large-farm advantage
Unskilled labor supervision, motivation, etc.
Local knowledge






















Source: Poulton, Dorward, and Kydd 2005.
Figure 2—Median farm sizes in the developing world


















































































Has economic development tipped the scales 
from small to large farms? Apparently not yet in 
most countries, to judge by the evidence of the 
decline  in  farm  sizes  in  the  developing  world 
(Lipton 2005b). Figure 1 shows how farm sizes 
have  fallen  in  many  developing  countries  over 
recent decades, just as they have been rising in 
most OECD countries. Figure 2 illustrates the trend 
for  selected  developing  countries.  Although  the 
declining farm size reflects the subdivision of farms 
arising from population growth, if economies of 
scale existed, then the operated unit size would 
not  necessarily  fall,  since  it  would  make  more 
sense to rent out small plots to larger operators. 
But, as Lipton comments, such cases are rare: most 
tenancy has the opposite effect as parts of larger 
farms are let out to smaller operators. 
An alternative explanation is that land markets 
are imperfect, so that less land than expected is 
transferred temporarily or permanently to reflect 
underlying optimal scales of production.7 On the 
one  hand,  imperfections  may  encourage  large 
landowners to retain their land under their own 
operation. Selling prices for land may be inflated 
well  above  the  discounted  value  of  the  future 
production, on account of the value of the land as 
collateral against bank credit, the social prestige 
of land ownership, or the expectation that land 
prices will rise. 
On the other hand, there are forces that may 
dissuade  owners  of  small  plots  from  selling  or 
renting  out  their  lands.  People  may  retain  and 
manage their own farms rather than renting them 
out for cultural reasons (Singh 2005). Imperfect 
labor markets and unemployment may make own 
cultivation of small pieces of land more attractive 
than  renting  out,  even  if  returns  are  higher  on 
larger farms. 
Both  large  and  small  landowners  may  also 
be reluctant to rent out fields for fear of not being 
able to regain their land quickly, or ever.
If this alternative interpretation is correct, then 
the  declining  average  farm  size  in  developing 
countries  does  not  demonstrate  any  superior 
economic  efficiency  of  small  farms.  It  does, 
however, demonstrate that even tiny landholdings 
remain  a  valued  component  of  a  diversified 
livelihood strategy in the context of highly imperfect 
land, labor, and capital markets.
Equity and Poverty
With  regard  to  equity  and  poverty  reduction, 
there  is  a  strong  case  for  preferring  small  to 
large farms. Small farms are typically operated 
by poor people who use much labor, both from 
their  own  households  and  from  their  equally 
poor, or poorer, neighbors. Many farm surveys 
have shown that the smaller the holding, the more 
labor  per  unit  area  is  applied  (Cornia  1985; 
Heltberg 1998). If there were no transaction costs 
in labor markets, this difference would not exist, 
but  given  the  costs  of  supervising  hired  labor, 
larger farmers tend to employ fewer workers than 
would otherwise be optimal.
Moreover, small-farm households have more 
favorable  expenditure  patterns  for  promoting 
growth of the local nonfarm economy, including 
rural  towns.  They  spend  higher  shares  of 
incremental  income  on  rural  nontradables  than 
large  farms  (Mellor  1976;  Hazell  and  Roell 
1983),  thereby  creating  additional  demand  for 
the many labor-intensive goods and services that 
are produced in local villages and towns. These 
demand-driven  growth  linkages  provide  greater 
income-earning opportunities for small farms and 
landless workers, among others. 
For  example,  the  modern  varieties  of  rice 
introduced  in  North  Arcot  district,  Tamil  Nadu, 
India,  between  the  early  1970s  and  the  early 
1980s led to a 50 percent increase in regional 
rice production over a decade. In this case, for 
every extra hundred rupees of income generated 
in farming, another 87 rupees were generated in 
the  local  nonfarm  economy,  creating  significant 
additional income and employment opportunities 
for the poor in the local towns and villages (Hazell 
and Ramasamy 1991). Small farmers and landless 
laborers,  for  example,  doubled  their  household 
7 Were land, labor, and capital markets perfect—with all parties secure in their rights, with complete information on the 
economics of production, no costs of negotiation, and equal access to capital—then land would be expected to move from 
larger to smaller units to correct the inverse ratio. The persistence of the inverse ratio suggests that less land is transferred than 
would be economically optimal. 13
income  over  the  decade,  with  important  shares 
coming  from  off-farm  employment  and  rural 
nonfarm sources. Notably, about 80 percent of 
the income increase in the rural nonfarm economy 
was attributable to consumption linkages and only 
20 percent to production links with agriculture.
Changes and Threats to  
Small Farmers
The  arguments  described  are  well  known  and 
widely accepted. What concerns some observers 
[see,  for  example,  Maxwell  (2003)  and  Ellis 
(2005)] is that in a changing world, the prospects 
for smallholders are deteriorating. Conditions for 
small farms have changed considerably since the 
Green Revolution of the mid-1960s to the 1980s. 
Contemporary  challenges  include  changing 
production methods and increased concentration 
in supply chains; low world prices and markets 
more open to international competition; changes 
in  research  and  development  (R&D)  systems; 
environmental degradation and climate change; 
the  impact  of  HIV/AIDS;  and  changes  in  the 
policy  environment.8  Most  of  these  challenges 
affect  both  large  and  small  farms,  but  do  they 
apply  more  strongly  to  small  farms?  If  small-
farm  households  were  more  threatened,  these 
challenges might leave them trapped in poverty 
or provoke massive and premature migration from 
rural to urban areas. We therefore now discuss 
challenges that may pose particular difficulties for 
smallholder farmers. 
Changing Production Methods and 
Greater Market Concentration
Changes  in  production  methods  and  supply 
chains may undermine smallholders’ efficiency in 
land use. Changing production technology affects 
economies of scale. Green Revolution technology, 
centered  on  seeds,  was  largely  scale  neutral; 
small  farmers  could  participate,  especially  as 
new rounds of crop breeding made the modern 
varieties less variable in yield and thus less risky.9 
When  new  technologies  involve  higher  capital 
inputs or mechanization or require high levels of 
education, they may disadvantage smaller farms 
unless explicit action is taken to help small farms 
reduce  their  transaction  costs  when  interacting 
with  input  suppliers,  bankers,  and  traders.10 
Many high-value crops require considerable up-
front  cash  investment  in  seeds,  fertilizers,  and 
pesticides. Yet small farms are less able to obtain 
farm credit than large farms or to obtain inputs at 
comparable prices. 
Second,  and  more  worrying,  are  the 
implications  of  changes  to  marketing  chains. 
Supermarket  operators  or  their  agents  are 
becoming  increasingly  important  in  parts  of  the 
developing  world,  especially  in  Latin  America. 
Buying  power  is  being  concentrated  in  a  few 
hands. Supermarkets have strict standards for the 
quality, consistency, and timeliness of supply. They 
may also require the ability to trace consignments 
back to source and to affirm the conditions under 
which it was produced, in terms of pesticide use, 
8 It could be argued that some of these challenges were present in the later agricultural transformations in China and Vietnam 
or were specifically addressed by policies and public investments.
9 As noted earlier, small farmers tend to be disadvantaged relative to larger farmers by increased market transactions for inputs, 
finance, and outputs (but not for labor). Green Revolution technologies increased not only input use, finance demands, risk, 
and outputs per hectare (favoring larger farms), but also labor demands (favoring smaller farms). These mixed benefits to small 
and large farms are consistent with the observation that the inverse ratio appeared to weaken in the early stages of the Green 
Revolution as large farmers adopted new technologies first, but was then often re-established in Green Revolution areas as new 
technologies were adopted on smaller farms. 
10 Dorward,Kydd, et al. (2004) argue that such interventions were critical to successful Green Revolutions in the past, supporting 
medium- and small-farmer access to finance, seasonal inputs, and, to a lesser extent, output markets. We discuss these issues 
in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, policies promoting parallel adoption of mechanization by larger farms often discriminated against 
small farms. organic cultivation, use of child labor, or animal 
welfare. They also often require the ability to adjust 
rapidly to changing consumer demands with new 
investments in equipment and knowledge. Small-
scale, undercapitalized, and often undereducated 
farmers  find  it  particularly  difficult  to  meet  the 
quantity,  timeliness,  traceability,  and  flexibility 
requirements  of  the  new  supply  chains,  even  if 
family labor is well suited to delivering high-quality 
products. Meeting the requirements for credence 
characteristics—those  that  cannot  be  proved  by 
examining the produce, but relate to production 
methods such as pesticide use—can be particularly 
onerous for smallholders: auditing and certification 
costs  have  strong  economies  of  scale  (Raynolds 
2004). By and large, smallholders have yet to find 
widely replicable institutional solutions to the new 
demands  (Boselie,  Henson,  and  Weatherspoon 
2003; Reardon and Timmer 2007).
The  importance  of  these  challenges  to 
smallholder  farmers  depends  on  several 
considerations. One is how quickly supermarkets 
are  capturing  the  marketing  chains,  particularly 
large  domestic  channels  that  deliver  food  to 
households of modest means. This process seems 
to have happened rapidly in Latin America and 
parts  of  Southeast  Asia  and  China.  It  appears 
to  be  a  much  patchier  and  slower  process  in 
Africa and South Asia. Box 2 considers this point. 
A  tentative  conclusion  is  that  supermarkets  will 
continue  to  advance  rapidly  where  they  have 
already gained a significant foothold—that is, in 
the  industrializing  and  middle-income  countries 
of East and Southeast Asia and Latin America. In 
other regions, and above all in Africa and South 
Asia, the advance may be quite slow. Given the 
large population shares still living on small farms 
in  these  countries,  the  idea  that  supermarkets 
will  rapidly  spread—thereby  possibly  closing 
down  small  farms’  marketing  options—may  be 
exaggerated. That said, it is devilishly difficult to 
predict such changes, since the key processes are 
discontinuous and nonlinear. 
Another  important  (and  related)  question  is 
whether supermarket buyers have alternatives to 
dealing  with  smallholders.  In  cases  of  bimodal 
land distribution, the buyers may be able to obtain 
the  supplies  they  need  from  a  relatively  small 
number of large-scale growers, thus cutting down 
on transaction costs. Where, however, supermarket 
buyers  have  no  alternative  to  sourcing  supplies 
from smallholders—because there are insufficient 
large  farmers  in  a  country  and  importation  is 
uneconomic or restricted by import regulations—
they have sometimes proved willing to invest in 
technical assistance and credit systems to improve 
the  quantity,  quality,  and  reliability  of  supplies 
(Reardon, Timmer, and Berdegué 2005).
A typology of situations can be constructed to 
assess  the  prospects  for  smallholders  (see  Table 
4).  This  typology  differentiates  along  two  axes. 
The  vertical  axis  separates  those  goods  where 
credence  attributes  matter  little—as  in  many 
staple foods and traditional export crops—from 
those where credence matters, typically in higher-
value produce such as horticulture and livestock.11 
The horizontal axis shows the difference between 
situations  where  buyers  have  to  deal  with 
smallholders because land distribution is relatively 
equal and those where land is unequally held and 
buyers can deal with large farmers exclusively. 
The  four  cells  identified  by  this  typology  are 
labeled A through D in Table 4.
Staples and traditional cash crops tend to be 
in cells A and B, with opportunities for smallholders 
to  compete,  especially  in  cell  A.  By  contrast, 
commodity  chains  for  higher-value  produce  are 
increasingly located in cells C and D. The well-
documented cases of smallholder exclusion from 
evolving marketing channels occur particularly in 
cell D (see, for example, Carter and Barham 1996; 
Dolan,  Humphrey,  and  Harris-Pascal  1999)  and 
sometimes in cell B (Latin American supermarket 
systems  summarized  by  Reardon  and  Berdegué 
2002). The few documented cases of success for 
smallholders in cell D tend to involve some form 
14
11  Note that where credence attributes are not insisted upon, small farms can thrive as suppliers of horticultural produce, 
because of their advantages over large farms in terms of labor quality and motivation (Reardon, Timmer, and Berdegué 2005). Box 2—The rise of the supermarkets
Data on supermarkets’ shares of retail food sales are incomplete. Moreover, different sources report different data, sometimes 
owing to differences in the definitions of supermarkets. As the table shows, the supermarkets’ share of retail food sales varies 
greatly. As might be imagined, the share tends to grow with urbanization and incomes. But there are also some significant 
regional effects, such as the very low shares seen in South Asia. 
SUPeRMARKeT ShAReS oF ReTAIL SALeS oF FooD (%)
Region/country  earlier share (year)  2001  Circa 2002  2015 projection
North Africa and Middle east
Egypt      10  13
Morocco       5  15
Tunisia      5  18
Turkey      37  45
Sub-Saharan Africa
Kenya      10  16
South Africa      55  83
east and Southeast Asia
China      11  27
China, urban  30 (1999)  48   
Indonesia  20 (1999)  25   
Korea  61 (1999)  65   
Malaysia  27 (1999)  31   
Philippines  52 (1999)  57   
Taiwan  65 (1999)  69   
Thailand  35 (1999)  43   
South Asia
Bangladesh      1  8
India      2  9
Pakistan       1  3
Latin America
Argentina  17 (1985)  57  54  61
Brazil  30 (1990)  75  49  76
Chile    50  62  77
Colombia    38  47  58
Costa Rica    50  55  63
El Salvador      54  68
Guatemala  15 (1994)  35  35  44
Honduras       42  54
Mexico    45  45  61
Panama       50  65
Paraguay       35  38
North America
United States  5–10 (1930)  80   
Sources: The first two data columns come from Reardon, Timmer, and Berdegué (2005). The third and fourth come 
from Traill (2006). In some cases the two sources of data do not tally. For the projection, Traill uses UN projections of 
urbanization and incomes in 2015 and assumes complete openness to foreign investment. 
Traill (2006) looked at the determinants of supermarket shares: increased incomes and urbanization raise supermarkets’ 
share, as does income inequality—presumably because the rich are more likely to shop in supermarkets. So too does female 
participation in the labor force. The more open an economy is to foreign direct investment, the greater the supermarket share 
of retail food sales—an effect that may arise not only as transnational retail corporations enter local markets, but also as com-
petition and demonstration effects stimulate national supermarket chains. 
Supermarkets seem to have increased their shares of retail food sales in the developing world rapidly since the early 1990s. 
Will this continue? Traill makes projections of likely shares in 2015 using projections of likely urbanization and incomes and 
assuming the economy to be completely open to foreign investment. The pattern is reasonably clear: economies where super-
markets already have 40 percent or more of sales will increase their shares by 10–20 more percentage points; countries that 
have low supermarket coverage will see their shares rise by smaller amounts, generally less than 10 percentage points. It 
seems, then, that the speed of advance of the supermarkets is uneven, and where they have not yet gained one third or more 
of retail food sales, the speed of advance may be quite slow over the next decade.
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of donor or NGO support and subsidy. Indeed, 
the best known (Hortico in Zimbabwe [Henson et 
al.  2005])  has  unusual  features  and  apparently 
recently  collapsed  owing  to  the  overvalued 
exchange rate. 
The  main  question  is,  will  the  supermarkets 
and  other  high-volume  buyers  turn  the  staples 
chains into those with high credence attributes? 
Supermarkets are most likely to try to change 
supply  chains  when  there  is  strong  demand  for 
foods from a thriving market—a situation associated 
with economic growth and rising incomes. Such 
circumstances are promising for small farms because 
they are likely to offer expanded opportunities for 
selling farm produce outside supermarket chains. 
They  also  offer  increased  demand  for  labor  in 
nonfarm  activities—a  boon  for  marginal  farms 
where households already depend heavily on off-
farm sources for their incomes. 
In  Africa,  supermarkets  have  penetrated 
furthest  where  there  is  access  to  large  farms 
(Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).12 
Where there are few large farms, and assuming 
restrictions  on  importing  supplies,  supermarkets 
will either not prevail or will have to enter into 
arrangements with smallholders.
The ability of small farmers to supply export 
and  local  high-quality,  high-value  horticultural 
supermarket chains is much more questionable—
but this is a lost opportunity more than a threat. 
Even  here,  however,  history  offers  some  hope. 
When  global  buyers  began  to  source  tropical 
produce  from  smallholders  in  the  developing 
world, one hundred or more years ago, they faced 
similar challenges of quality and consistency. In 
most  cases,  solutions  were  found,  and  much  of 
the tropical export supply came from small farms. 
Large-scale plantations were, for most products, 
the  exception  rather  than  the  norm—apparently 
since economies of scale applied in processing, 
but  not  in  production  (Hayami  1996,  2000). 
Again,  policy  may  be  important  here  if  it  can 
encourage  (rather  than  deter)  buyers  or  large-
scale producers to search for innovations that will 
draw in smallholder producers.  
It  is  not  yet  clear  how  current  changes  will 
affect  small  farms,  and  the  impacts  will  almost 
certainly  differ  considerably  by  context.  The 
policy challenge, however, is clear: how to make 
the  institutional  innovations  that  will  allow  at 
least  some  small  farms  to  overcome  increased 
transaction  costs  and  take  advantage  of  the 
emerging supply chains. 
Decline in Commodity Prices and  
More Open Domestic Markets
The prices of most agricultural commodities have, 
in  real  terms,  been  falling  in  the  long  run. 
12  It may nevertheless be premature to conclude that it is the presence of a large-farm sector that has permitted this growth. 
An alternative explanation, consistent with discussions in earlier sections of this paper, is that a productive large-farm sector 
has supported agroindustrial development, such that a larger urban middle class now exists in these countries than in many 
others within the continent, providing the necessary demand for supermarket growth.
Table 4—Commercial interest in sourcing supplies from small farmers
Country’s agricultural 
productivity potential
Demand for output from small farms and inequality in farm structure
Unimodal land distribution—high 
demand for smallholder produce
Unimodal land distribution—low 









Source: Poulton, Dorward, and Kydd 2005.Moreover, some price falls seen in the last quarter 
century  seem  unusually  sharp  (for  charts  of  the 
real  prices  of  key  agricultural  commodities,  see 
“Commodity Markets Briefs” on the World Bank 
website). Prices fell dramatically during the 1980s 
and then experienced further declines, or at best 
fluctuations around a static position. The increased 
openness  of  domestic  markets  also  means  that 
producers are much more exposed to competition 
from imports 
The consequences for all producers are clear: 
if they cannot raise their productivity or otherwise 
reduce their unit costs of production faster than 
prices  fall,  they  will  lose  income.  Whether 
smallholders are more vulnerable to falling prices 
than  larger  farmers  hinges  largely  on  whether 
small farmers produce at higher cost than larger 
operators. Evidence on this is scant: data on costs 
of  production  on  different-sized  farms  are  not 
regularly collected in most developing countries, 
and in any case estimates of land and labor costs 
for such calculations are fraught with difficulties. 
Cross-country comparisons of costs for particular 
products may act as a proxy for farm size, but they 
are not easy to make since national surveys have 
different  ways  of  defining  and  recording  costs 
and sometimes also use different conventions for 
presenting summary measures. Still, in the cotton 
sector,  West  African  smallholders  are  believed 
to be among the lowest-cost cotton producers in 
the world. Arguments for the inverse relationship 
might  also  suggest  that  smaller  farms  are  on 
average lower-cost producers. 
Notwithstanding  smallholders’  present  costs 
of production, they may be less able to adapt to 
falling commodity prices than large farms, for two 
reasons. One, since marginal costs of capital are 
generally considered to be higher for small farms 
than  large,  they  may  be  more  disadvantaged 
when  development  requires  increased  capital 
investment  in  purchased  inputs  or  equipment. 
Unfortunately, this is the case for most agricultural 
development  opportunities  with  the  potential  to 
drive significant increases in productivity. 
Two, smaller farms may also be disadvantaged 
if prices are more variable, because they are less 
able  to  insure  themselves  against  price  risk  or 
to  get  access  to  capital  to  take  them  through 
periods of low prices within or between seasons. 
Large farms are less disadvantaged by fluctuating 
prices as they are more able to take advantage of 
individual years when prices are good.13
The  converse  is  the  question  of  how  much 
small farmers could benefit from higher commodity 
prices if these were to be achieved through world 
trade  reform.  Small  farms’  difficulties  in  access-
ing services and credit mean that they are often 
constrained in their ability to take advantage of 
higher prices by expanding production. Exceptions 
to this include the limited number of areas where 
(1) it is still possible to expand the total land area 
planted, or (2) contract farming systems provide 
smallholder growers with all the services that they 
need.14  Large farms, on the other hand, with bet-
ter access to markets, information, and capital, will 
often be better placed to take advantage of any 
price gains.
Agricultural Research
There are concerns that research systems in devel-
oping countries are generating fewer innovations 
to raise yields than a quarter century ago. Funding 
to  the  international  agricultural  research  centers 
has fallen in real terms. Moreover, the centers have 
devoted  more  of  their  resources  to  investigating 
yield  protection  (against  pests  and  water  prob-
lems, for instance) than yield increases. Similarly, 
researchers have been asked to look as much at 
issues such as natural resource management and 
gender as plant productivity. 
17
13 There is a more general point here regarding large farm advantages in coping with variability—they are also likely to do 
better in years with good weather and yields if access to seasonal capital and storage facilities allows them to store produce 
from good harvests until prices improve. Small farms without storage facilities and capital are more likely to be forced to sell 
soon after harvest when markets are glutted and prices low. 
14 Gillson et al. (2004) found that African cotton production, especially in Tanzania and Zimbabwe, was highly responsive 
to the world cotton lint price—indeed, more responsive to price than was U.S. production. In both Tanzania and Zimbabwe, 
however, production responded with a one-year lag, by which time world prices had often changed again. This phenomenon 
highlights the disadvantage that smallholders face relative to large farms in terms of market intelligence. Fewer innovations for yield increases affect all 
farmers, large and small. But there is one way in 
which smallholders may be harder hit. The balance 
of research funding has shifted dramatically from 
public-  to  private-funded  research,  particularly  in 
biotechnology, where there is the greatest potential 
for  major  advances.  This  change  in  the  funding 
of  research  is  disadvantageous  to  smaller  farm-
ers because private research firms lack incentives 
to  address  small  farmers’  concerns  (Pingali  and 
Traxler 2002) and instead focus more on the needs 
of and opportunities for larger farmers.
Environmental Degradation and  
Climate Change
Farming modifies the local environment, in some 
cases  causing  substantial  damage  and  in  other 
cases  making  improvements.  Soil  erosion,  soil 
degradation, desertification, salination, deforesta-
tion, loss of biodiversity, depletion of groundwater 
aquifers, and pollution of watercourses are all pos-
sible consequences of some farming practices. The 
results are losses to society as a whole and rising 
costs for agricultural producers. 
Evidence  of  environmental  impacts  is,  how-
ever, patchy. Historically, careful studies of changes 
to soil and water quality have usually had to be 
carried out on a small scale, although the devel-
opment of near infrared spectroscopy looks set to 
change this (Shepherd et al. 2003). Extrapolating 
from such studies to make estimates for larger areas 
is fraught with problems.15 In addition, studies of 
environmental  change  tend  to  focus  on  damage 
and do not always take into account improvements 
made by farmers, such as soil conservation works 
and tree planting. 
Climate change represents a global phenom-
enon to which farming contributes in part and to 
which it is especially vulnerable, since most farming 
depends upon the weather. Although the science of 
climate change is reasonably well established in 
broad outline, the precise impacts of processes that 
play out over decades are as yet only vaguely dis-
cernable. For example, attempts to predict changes 
in rainfall for different large regions of the world 
have very large margins of error. At the scale of 
countries  and  major  regions  within  them,  much 
more work is needed to improve prediction of the 
impact of climate change, but there is increasing 
evidence that crop production will be hardest hit in 
tropical areas, particularly in Africa (Hulme et al. 
2001; Royal Society 2005).  
The  impacts  of  both  environmental  degrada-
tion and climate change are usually assumed to be 
more severe for small farmers than for larger hold-
ings,16 on the grounds that small farmers have less 
access to human, social, and financial capital and 
information than do larger farmers. This assumption 
is plausible, but not proven, and it might equally be 
argued that larger farmers who have heavy invest-
ments in fixed capital are also very vulnerable to 
changes in the environment. Smallholders whose 
major asset is their labor power may be able to 
adapt  their  production  patterns  and  practices  to 
new environmental conditions more easily. Again, 
the evidence on the relative impacts of these chang-
es on small and large farmers is limited. 
The Impact of HIV/AIDS
Although the threat of HIV/AIDS is nearly universal, 
the pandemic has been most prevalent to date in 
Eastern and Southern Africa. HIV infection typically 
runs at 10 percent or more of the adult popula-
tion, reaching almost 40 percent in Botswana and 
Swaziland.  Large  numbers  are  dying—in  Sub-
Saharan Africa, between 2 and 2.5 million persons 
died of the syndrome in 2003 (UNAIDS 2004). 
For HIV/AIDS-affected households, the immedi-
ate effects on farming include loss of labor to sick-
ness, death, and caring, and erosion of capital and 
18
15 For  example,  soil  erosion  measurements  are  usually  made  from  plots  that  measure  less  than  one  tenth  of  a  hectare. 
Extrapolating the results from such plots to a river basin does not take into account that much of the soil washed off one area 
is retained in some other part of the basin where it is deposited as silt. There are even some cases of farmers deliberately 
encouraging soil erosion from hillsides to improve the soil of their valley-bottom lands. 
16 Climate change impacts extend beyond agriculture to include other sectors, such as health, where poor and vulnerable 
communities are likely to be hit hardest (IPCC 2001).assets to pay for drugs, treatment, and transport 
to hospital.17 For the households in question, the 
consequences may be less land tilled, less use of 
purchased inputs, and substitutions from cash crops 
to food crops for subsistence and survival and from 
crops with high peak demands for labor to those 
less demanding of labor. Cash crops are particu-
larly likely to be abandoned when adult males fall 
sick, since men typically assume responsibility for 
such crops and have the contacts to market the pro-
duce. Agricultural skills and knowledge, including 
highly specific knowledge of the local ecology and 
plants, may not be passed down the generations 
(Mutangadura,  Mukurazita,  and  Jackson  1999; 
Jayne et al. 2004).
HIV/AIDS can cruelly expose gender imbal-
ances: widows often find they must struggle to 
maintain their rights to land held in the name of 
their  deceased  husbands.  They  may  lose  con-
tracts for cash crops. They are less likely to get 
access to credit or extension advice than did their 
late husbands.
Within  the  wider  community,  mutual  support 
networks may wither in the face of an epidemic 
that creates heavy additional demands that exceed 
either the capacity or willingness of the unaffected 
population to respond. Loss of leaders and other 
key members of the community may undermine the 
working of local organizations and institutions. 
The broad outline of impacts is well rehearsed. 
More precise estimates, and an understanding of 
how the impacts at levels from household to village 
to  region  and  country  interact,  are  lacking.  The 
evidence from rural communities is still thin.18
Some  plausible  ideas  about  the  effects  on 
overall  farming  systems  and  agricultural  sectors 
may not apply. For example, although individual 
households may lose labor, rural populations will 
continue to rise, so the overall labor supply will 
probably not fall. The calls already made for turn-
ing the attention of agricultural research and exten-
sion to labor-saving innovations may be appropri-
ate for individual households, but less necessary for 
the wider community.19
The impacts on afflicted households may vary 
considerably by household, depending on who is 
sick and dies and on the household’s assets. Loss of 
household heads20 and those with earning power 
creates more hardship than the loss of others. And 
impacts  can  be  severe  for  households  with  few 
assets. Some events may wrongly be attributed to 
the epidemic. For example, recent cropping shifts 
in  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  from  grains  to 
tubers may arise from changing factor prices, not 
from HIV/AIDS. 
The  most  dire  predictions,  as  seen  in  the 
New  Variant  Famine  hypothesis  (de  Waal  and 
Tumushabe 2003) that sees households and com-
munities losing assets to the point that shocks to 
the system are likely to result in outright famine, 
do not seem to be borne out by observations from 
Zambia. There, despite HIV prevalence of 17 per-
cent of adults, the lowest quartile of smallholder 
households did not reduce their area tilled or their 
crop output or lose assets in the period 1990–2003 
(Jayne et al. 2004).
Responding to the epidemic’s challenge to agri-
culture may require, above all, an intensified effort 
to raise farm productivity by expanding the menu 
of  technical  innovations  plus  redress  of  gender 
biases in land rights and in access to extension, 
education, and marketing chains. In large part, the 
agenda is not new—the epidemic is what makes 
it so much more important to succeed and draws 
attention  to  issues  that  have  long  needed  more 
concerted action. 
Are  smallholders  more  at  risk  of  contracting 
HIV/AIDS?  In  the  early  stages  of  the  epidemic, 
small farmers may have been less at risk, since the 
virus was most likely to affect the urban, the mobile, 
19
17 See Jayne et al. (2004) for one of the most comprehensive reviews of the effects of HIV/AIDS on agriculture. 
18 Jayne et al. (2004) is the main source for the arguments that follow in this section.
19 This has probably always been the case: within any village, households have different relative endowments of land, labor, 
and capital—differences that factor markets, even when functioning reasonably well, do not completely even out. Hence, there 
has long been a demand for a wider range of technical options to suit such differing circumstances. 
20  Recent  research  reports  that  the  majority  of  deaths  are  not  necessarily  heads  of  household  or  their  spouses   
(Mather et al. 2004).and those with higher incomes. Subsequently the 
epidemic has spread into rural areas, including 
some  of  the  more  remote  ones,  leaving  small 
farmers equally at risk as other groups. 
Are the impacts of the epidemic on smallholders 
more  severe  than  on  larger  farmers?  Some 
smallholders who are poor and lack assets may be 
particularly affected. Studies to date (Mather et al. 
2004) show that poor households lacking assets, 
savings, and other means to cover the costs of the 
disease  are  more  vulnerable  to  reduced  output, 
loss of productive assets, and eventual destitution. 
But perhaps the most salient point about the 
impact of the epidemic is the sharp discrimination 
that  it  exerts.  Those  households  affected  by  the 
disease  may  incur  heavy  losses  of  all  kinds; 
neighboring  households  whose  members  are 
not  seropositive  may  be  little  affected  by  the 
epidemic.21 The impact of the disease is highly 
uneven.
Changes in the Policy Environment
Since  the  1980s  the  international  community 
has  moved  away  from  supporting  government 
intervention in agricultural development. Although 
government involvement was a ubiquitous feature 
of successful “green revolutions” (Dorward, Kydd, 
et al. 2004), the high fiscal costs associated with 
many marketing and input subsidies became an 
escalating burden as governments proved unable 
to phase them out once they had achieved their 
initial  purposes.  India,  for  example,  currently 
spends about US$10 billion per year on subsidies 
that  are  largely  unproductive  (Dorward,  Kydd, 
et  al.  2004).  Similar  problems  persist  in  many 
other  Asian  countries.  In  Africa,  early  Green 
Revolution  successes  like  hybrid  maize  proved 
unsustainable because of their high fiscal costs, 
which  contributed  to  eventual  debt  crises  and 
stagnation  in  many  of  the  countries  where  it 
spread (Smale and Jayne 2003). 
The  shift  from  extensive  government 
interventions to a narrower state role, which leaves 
private  actors  in  the  market  to  provide  inputs, 
services,  credit,  and  marketing,  has  left  many 
smallholders at a disadvantage because they face 
higher transaction costs in the markets than larger 
operators.  
Threats to Small Farmers: Summary
Not  all  of  the  changes  that  might  be  thought 
particularly harmful to small farmers are necessarily 
any worse for them than they are for larger-scale 
farmers.  But  some  clear  threats  to  small  farms 
emerge.  In  large  part  they  arise  from  market 
failures, themselves amplified by the policy retreat 
from  intervention  that  has  left  the  private  sector 
operating within markets as the main actor in input 
supply,  financial  services,  marketing,  and  even 
technical advice and innovations. If smallholders 
are  to  survive  and  prosper,  then  they  must  find 
ways to meet new demands in supply chains and 
to obtain inputs, credit, and technical knowledge 
from  private  agents  at  competitive  prices  with 
large-scale farms. A key question is how far the 
public  sector  should  intervene  in  helping  small 
farms gain access to markets, technologies, and 
support services rather than leaving everything to 
the private sector. How one answers this question 
is one of the key differences between those who 
believe that small farmers have a future and those 
who do not. 
20
21 Indeed, they may conceivably benefit from those affected selling livestock, land, or other valuable assets at distress prices.21
Debate about the future role of agriculture and 
the viability of small farms continues and will 
probably not be resolved until sufficient new evi-
dence emerges from the post-globalized era to 
enable rigorous hypothesis testing. In the mean-
time, policymakers must make strategic decisions 
about development priorities, and their actions 
will themselves have an important impact on the 
final outcomes for small farms. 
Roles for Small Farms
In Chapter 2 we reviewed the role agriculture 
can play in different country contexts (see Table 
2). Table 5 takes this analysis a step further and 
highlights the key roles that small farms might 
play in each type of context. Two key roles are 
identified.  One is a growth or development 
role. This role arises when agriculture itself has a 
growth role to play and when commercially ori-
ented small farms are efficient and can compete 
in the market. Because many small farmers are 
also poor, these situations can be win-win oppor-
tunities for growth and poverty alleviation. Such 
opportunities are most likely to arise in countries 
with reasonable agricultural potential and where 
land is already distributed equitably.
Countries starting with large mineral or urban-
based  manufacturing  sectors  will  have  high 
exchange rates and ready access to low-cost food 
imports,  so  small-farm  growth  opportunities  are 
likely to be limited to high-value domestic markets. 
But  in  countries  where  agriculture  is  the  lead 
growth  sector,  small-farm  growth  opportunities 
will  arise  primarily  in  the  domestic  market  for 
food  staples  and  in  high-value  export  markets, 
at least during the early stages of development 
when the domestic market for high-value products 
is still small. 
A second role for small farms arises from its 
potential  social  contributions.  Small  farms  can 
provide  a  way  for  governments  to  spread  the 
benefits  from  a  large  mineral  or  urban-based 
manufacturing sector during the early stages of 
development when most people are still engaged 
in  agriculture.  As  economies  grow,  small  farms 
can also serve as a useful reserve employer until 
sufficient exit opportunities exist—a role that can 
be especially important in fast-growing countries 
regardless  of  their  primary  engine  of  growth. 
Finally, small farms may provide a social safety 
net or subsistence living for many of the rural poor, 
even when they are too small to be commercially 
viable.  These  social  roles  are  most  important 
in  countries  with  poor  agricultural  productivity 
potential,  a  biomodal  distribution  of  land,  or 
a  large  mineral  or  urban-based  manufacturing 
sector.  These  social  roles  do  not  necessarily 
require that small farms be commercially viable, 
and in fact subsistence-oriented small farms may 
be the most appropriate ones to target.
As economic transformation proceeds, small 
farms play a shrinking role in all kinds of countries. 
Rising real wages within the wider economy tend 
to  drive  farm  consolidation  (as  has  occurred 
in many OECD countries and is now occurring 
in  parts  of  East  Asia),  and  the  small  farmers 
that survive find niches in high-value markets or 
become  part-time  farmers.  Small  farms’  role  as 
a reserve employer, however, is tricky because it 
can lead to government support policies that keep 
too many people in agriculture for too long, as 
happened in many OECD countries.
4. Strategies for Small Farms22
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The Role of Government 
Interventions
Should  governments  intervene  to  support  small 
farms? There is less debate about this issue when 
considering social roles since even the most ardent 
free market advocates expect market solutions to 
provide only efficient outcomes, not necessarily 
equitable  or  poverty-reducing  outcomes.  Direct 
support to subsistence-oriented small farms may 
be a more cost-effective alternative to other forms 
of  income  transfers  and  social  safety  nets.  For 
example,  food  aid,  donors’  common  response 
to  distress,  typically  costs  more  than  US$250 
for  each  metric  ton  of  cereals  delivered  in 
rural  areas,  compared  with  typical  smallholder 
production costs of US$100 or less.22 But this will 
not always be the case. Moreover, it is important 
that  support  policies  for  nonviable  small  farms 
do not encourage too many workers and poor 
people to stay in agriculture or for too long. 
The  need  for  governments  to  support 
commercially  oriented  small  farms  to  exploit 
growth  opportunities  is  less  obvious.  In  such 
situations, it might seem that governments should 
stand back and let market forces hold sway in 
driving agriculture and small-farm development. 
In  theory,  this  process  should  ensure  that  the 
most efficient types of agriculture, commodities, 
regions, and farm sizes prevail. Policy interventions 
would focus on providing an enabling economic 
environment for market-led development, typically 
by  providing  stable  and  undistorted  economic 
incentives  and  essential  public  goods  and 
services. 
Although  widely  favored  in  much  contemporary 
development  thinking,  this  approach  faces  the 
problem  that  there  are  many  institutional  and 
market  failures  in  poor  countries  and  these 
failures can lead to discriminatory and inefficient 
outcomes. For example, if market failures penalize 
small farms over large ones in accessing markets 
and  inputs,  then  unfettered  markets  may  favor 
large-farm  outcomes  that  are  less  efficient  as 
well as less equitable than those that could result 
from small farm–led growth. In this case, targeted 
policy  interventions  that  correct  the  underlying 
market  failures  might  be  win-win  solutions  for 
efficiency and equity. 
A wide range of failures in input and output 
markets exist in developing countries, and many 
of these are linked and spill over from one market 
to  another.  Agricultural  development  requires  a 
process  of  sustainable  intensification  in  which 
farmers combine land, labor, technical skills and 
information,  purchased  inputs,  and  fixed  and 
working  capital  to  produce  outputs  for  sale.  If 
they  are  to  invest  in  sustainable  intensification 
they need to be assured of reasonably reliable 
access  to  a  complete  set  of  these  factors  of 
production  and  input  and  output  services,  on 
reasonable  terms.  If  one  element  of  the  set  is 
missing, then investments in all the others will be 
lost or significantly reduced. 
Analysts  differ  in  the  extent  to  which  they 
believe these complementarities pose a problem 
for the development of private service suppliers. 
Conventional  liberalization  policy  does  not 
recognize this as a problem. Other analysts (for 
example,  Poulton,  Dorward,  and  Kydd  2005) 
observe  that  potential  service  suppliers  face 
uncertain demand for their services unless farmers 
are  assured  of  access  to  other  complementary 
services. Such assurance is lacking in poor rural 
areas that have not yet achieved a widespread 
transition  out  of  low  input/low  output  farming 
unless some external agent undertakes to provide 
the  important  missing  services  or  coordinates 
22 All tons in this paper are metric tons. For communal areas of Zimbabwe, the estimated cost of producing one ton of maize 
was under US$80 in 1995/96 (Sukume et al. 2000) interestingly, the same source computes a production cost of just under 
US$70 a ton for maize from large-scale commercial farms that usually enjoy better soils than the small farmers in the same 
ecological zone (the agroecological zone known as Natural Region II in this case). 
Imports of maize on the world market usually cost at least US$220, including cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) to Harare; if 
they are then delivered to rural areas, additional transport and handling costs must be added. 
In Malawi in 2003–04, an informed adviser on food security claimed that although the import parity price of maize was around 
US$250 a ton, it cost a leading food aid agency as much as US$450 a ton to deliver food aid to rural clients, including the 
cost of targeting. provision of the missing services by other actors. 
Such coordination mechanisms must be credible 
to farmers and to all service providers. Without 
such mechanisms, it is argued, private investors 
will  not  invest  significant  capital  in  developing 
agricultural  service  businesses  and  will  only 
provide opportunistic agricultural services that do 
not require significant investment in specific assets 
(dedicated  fixed  costs).  These  arguments  are 
supported by several observations: (1) successful 
“green revolutions” (involving staple crops) were 
generally  associated  with  some  state  activity 
in  service  coordination  (Dorward,  Kydd,  et  al. 
2004); (2) intensive cash-crop production by small 
farmers is generally developed through contract 
farming, interlocking systems, or complementary 
coordination  by  supply  chain  facilitators  or 
champions  (Best,  Ferris,  and  Schiavone  2005); 
and (3) it is hard to find examples of sustainable 
intensification  of  small  farms  without  such 
mechanisms (Poulton et al. 2006).
If  complementary  coordination  is  important, 
then  some  problems  in  service  delivery  cannot 
be addressed by focusing on individual services; 
specific attention needs to be given to establishing 
mechanisms for complementary coordination. Yet 
differences  in  market  characteristics  for  different 
kinds  of  products  present  a  challenge,  as  well 
as opportunities for developing different types of 
mechanisms.  In  broad  terms  private  companies 
face  potential  gains  in  taking  on  the  costs  and 
risks of complementary coordination for small-farm 
production if (1) high fixed costs in processing or 
other downstream costs provide strong incentives 
for  firms  to  have  secure  high-volume  purchases; 
(2) small farms are important suppliers (because 
they  are  lower-cost  suppliers  than  large  farms, 
because  there  are  political  benefits  in  dealing 
with small farms, or because land tenure systems 
mean  that  there  are  no  larger  farms  to  source 
from; see Table 4 and associated discussion); and   
(3) the company has some degree of monopsony 
in buying farmers’ produce so that crop purchases 
can provide some collateral for loans for seasonal 
capital and thus some protection against strategic 
default by farmers.23 Conditions 1 and 3 are often 
related in that high fixed costs lead to economies of 
scale and represent an entry barrier to small-scale 
buyers. They therefore encourage smaller numbers 
of larger buyers in a more concentrated market. 
Larger buyers are then more likely to be able to 
access the capital and develop the organizational 
capability  to  deliver  low-cost  services  to  large 
numbers of small farms. Where these conditions 
are lacking, however, private sector companies are 
unlikely  to  provide  complementary  coordination 
mechanisms  and  these  mechanisms  must  be 
provided by other actors. 
Large-scale success in the past has required 
large-scale  interventions  by  governments,  but 
African  experience  with  such  interventions  has 
often been disappointing, with high costs and low 
returns. There are few if any examples of large-
scale and effective coordination mechanisms in 
staple crop production that have not involved the 
state. A key challenge to small farm development 
in poor rural areas is therefore the development 
of  new  coordination  systems  and  new 
complementary roles for governments (including 
local governments and ministries of agriculture), 
civil society organizations, farmer organizations, 
and  large-  and  small-scale  agribusiness  firms. 
Such  mechanisms  are  being  developed  and 
tested on a small scale, with mixed success (see, 
for  example,  Poulton,  Kydd,  et  al.  2005),  but 
much  greater  efforts  are  needed  in  adaptive 
policy research.
Policy Support for Small Farms  
over Time
Table  5  implies  that  the  need  for  particular 
types of policy support should vary by country 
context and stage of development. The poorest 
countries  and  rural  areas,  at  a  very  low  stage 
of development, are characterized by low road 
density,  poor  roads,  poor  telecommunications, 
poor human health, lack of irrigation infrastructure, 
and lack of productive agricultural technologies. 
24
23 This protection can also be achieved by horizontal coordination between buyers who agree to share information about 
farmers who default on loans (Stockbridge, Smith, and Lohano 1998).  25
They  also  lack  a  developed  and  diversified 
monetary economy; the markets for agricultural 
inputs, outputs, and finance are very “thin” (with 
small  and  unreliable  traded  volumes);  and  the 
business environment is, to say the least, difficult. 
Information on prices, technologies, markets, and 
other  potential  market  players  is  poor,  contract 
enforcement is difficult and weak, and risks are 
high—not only in production and prices, but also 
in  access  to  input  and  output  markets  and  to 
financial and transport services. In such conditions 
there  is  a  strong  need  for  investment  in  public 
goods,  infrastructure,  agricultural  research  and 
extension, and institutions to support business and 
market activity. Market conditions of poor rural 
areas  are  also  likely  to  encourage  a  low-level 
equilibrium in which complementary services are 
not provided to small farms, particularly services 
for small-farm production of staple crops. 
Successful  agricultural  development 
that  provides  public  goods  and  overcomes 
coordination  failure  should,  however,  lead  to 
the  establishment  of  thick  markets  and,  with 
time,  these  should  be  able  to  provide  effective 
complementary coordination without the need for 
nonmarket arrangements. Policies promoting such 
coordination  are  then  no  longer  needed,  and 
indeed are likely to inhibit market development. 
Dorward,  Kydd,  et  al.  (2004)  analyze  the 
successes  and  failures  of  supply-side,  state-led 
policies  and  demand-side  market  liberalization 
phases  of  agricultural  policy.  Looking  at  the 
sequencing and effectiveness of attempts to address 
problems related to public goods, complementary 
coordination,  and  market  development,  they 
describe a common pattern of government policy 
in successful “green revolutions” in terms of two 
active policy phases. The first phase “establishes 
the  basics”  with  investments  in  public  goods 
to  develop  technologies  that  will  raise  small 
farms’  potential  productivity.  Then  the  second 
phase  “kick-starts  markets”  with  coordinated 
complementary  investments  to  improve  small 
farmers’ access to the financial services and input 
and  output  markets  necessary  for  technology 
adoption. Once large numbers of farmers have 
successfully  adopted  the  new  technology  with 
sustained participation in financial services, input, 
and output markets, then these markets can attract 
private sector investment, allowing governments to 
withdraw—although they often find this difficult. 
Government Effectiveness
The  analysis  described  draws  attention  to  the 
important challenges facing policy interventions 
to support small-farm development. Not only are 
complex interventions needed at early stages of 
development, but these need to be adjusted and 
changed as development proceeds.
Critics of small-farm development are doubtful 
whether many governments have the capability to 
effectively implement these kinds of agendas. A 
key question for any intervention is whether the 
net economic and social benefits of intervening 
are sufficient to justify the costs. In many countries 
administrative  and  technical  capacity  is  weak 
in  government,  and  particularly  in  ministries  of 
agriculture. These weaknesses are not new (see, 
for example, the discussions in Timmer 1991) but 
have been exacerbated by structural adjustment 
programs  and  market  liberalization  programs 
that neglected rather than reformed many public 
institutions serving rural areas. These weaknesses 
pose challenges for any government interventions 
that aim to facilitate supply of services to small 
farms, whether these interventions are restricted 
to  the  supply  of  services  with  public-good 
characteristics  or  include  a  wider  coordinating 
role, though the challenges will be different. In 
some cases small-farm development policy might 
be more costly and challenging than alternative 
development  strategies  based,  for  example, 
on  delivery  of  health  and  education  services. 
They must therefore be justified on the basis of 
significant win-win benefits or poverty reduction 
(Maxwell, Urey, and Ashley 2001). 
Small-farm  proponents  must  include  early 
reform and strengthening of key public institutions at the core of their agenda. Such reform will often 
require  overcoming  vested  interests;  otherwise 
new  forms  of  inefficiencies  and  rent  seeking 
simply replace the old. New innovations may be 
needed. For example, increased donor support 
of key public sector investments could be based 
on  financing  arrangements  that  empower  the 
users of public services (such as vouchers, user 
fees, and other cofinancing mechanisms) and are 
backed up with appropriate institutional reforms 
to improve mandates and performance of public 
institutions. 
There is also need to form new partnerships 
between  the  public,  private,  and  NGO  sectors 
for  the  provision  of  public  services.  Even 
though government must pay for many of these 
goods and services, the public sector does not 
necessarily  have  to  deliver  them.  Recent  years 
have seen considerable success in using NGOs 
and  community-based  organizations  to  deliver 
targeted  assistance  to  the  poor,  and  private 
firms  can  be  contracted  to  build  and  maintain 
schools,  health  centers,  roads,  and  the  like. 
Contracting arrangements with other parties can 
be  much  more  cost-effective  and  may  offer 
better possibilities for involving local people and 
communities.  The  types  of  partnerships  desired 
will vary by sector and function, with many more 
opportunities to diversify supply arrangements for 
education and health services, for example, than 
provision of rural roads and market regulation.
The Politics of Assisting  
Small Farms
Although  there  are  country  contexts  where 
government  support  for  small-farm  development 
is clearly warranted, this does not mean it will or 
can happen. Successful intervention also requires 
that governments have the interest and capacity to 
mobilize the support that is needed. Political will 
is  the  fundamental  precondition  for  agricultural 
investment  and  policy  reform.  Decisionmakers 
(senior  politicians  and  bureaucrats)  have  to 
decide  to  prioritize  agricultural  investment  over 
competing  investment  options  and  to  take  on 
the task of reforming policy, which may provoke 
opposition  from  some  quarters.  They,  therefore, 
must be persuaded of the benefits or necessity of 
doing this. 
The  Green  Revolution  followed  serious 
commitment  to  agriculture  by  Asian  and  Latin 
American  governments  who  not  only  invested 
heavily in the necessary rural infrastructures and 
technologies, but also implemented major policy 
and institutional reforms to support agriculture. 
In China, national interest considerations were 
important in generating the agricultural reforms 
that commenced in 1978. Two decades of policy 
failures during the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution had weakened the economy 
and  damaged  the  credibility  of  the  political 
leadership. Economic reform was initiated in 1978 
in the agricultural sector because of a “perception 
at the top that stagnation of agricultural productivity 
was a bottleneck hindering further development 
of the overall economy” (Gulati, Fan, and Dalafi 
2005, 12).
Similarly,  in  India  national  interest  consider-
ations  were  important  in  generating  the  major 
investments  of  the  Green  Revolution  era.  These 
investments  were  undertaken  in  response  to  the 
country’s  precarious  food-security  situation,  cou-
pled with its reluctance to bow to the political pres-
sures that accompanied acceptance of Public Law 
480 food aid from the United States. Ideology—in 
the form of Nehru’s advocacy of science for agri-
culture (which preceded the food aid issue)—also 
played a role (Visvanathan 2003). 
In  both  China  and  India,  commercially 
oriented  small  farms  were  major  beneficiaries 
of  the  public  interventions,  particularly  land 
policies,  grain  marketing  and  support  services, 
and agricultural R&D. 
In  Latin  America  there  was  also  significant 
government commitment to agriculture, but small 
farms  never  received  the  same  priority  as  in 
Asia. This situation was largely a reflection of the 
prevailing and highly inequitable distribution of 
land and the powerful entrenched interests of the 
landed class (Lopez 2004). 
In many Asian and Latin American countries 
there is continued public support for and investment 
in  agriculture,  but  major  political  economy 
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support  to  agriculture  in  the  Green  Revolution 
heartlands,  now  that  the  developmental  job  of 
kick-starting markets has long been accomplished. 
Vested  interests  and  widespread  opposition  in 
rural  areas  have  become  major  impediments 
to  adapting  the  policy  agenda  to  changing 
economic  conditions,  even  though  reorienting 
public expenditure away from subsidies toward 
expenditures on key public goods—such as rural 
roads and agricultural research—would provide a 
greater stimulus to agricultural growth and future 
small-farm opportunities.
In  African  political  discourse,  agriculture  is 
regularly  referred  to  as  the  “backbone  of  the 
economy,”  yet  the  share  of  national  budgets 
devoted  to  agriculture  remains  consistently  well 
below that in Asia (Fan and Rao 2003).24 Even 
when significant sums are spent, they tend to be 
on  subsidy  programs  rather  than  on  long-term 
investments  in  productive  capacity.  Moreover, 
despite  structural  adjustment  programs,  many 
African  countries  have  yet  to  fully  implement 
needed policy reforms because of the resistance of 
entrenched political and bureaucratic interests that 
retain control of policy levers useful for patronage 
or rent-seeking purposes. Meanwhile, as budgets 
have  contracted,  long-term  investment  has  been 
increasingly left to donors, whose own funding for 
the agricultural sector has been in decline.
Overall,  the  political  economy  prospects 
for pro-smallholder agricultural development are 
not  that  favorable  in  any  region  today.  But 
a  number  of  changes  are  underway  in  the 
development agenda that have the potential to 
modify this story in many poor countries (Birner 
and Resnick 2005). These are democratization, 
decentralization, and the increasing reliance on 
participatory  policy  processes  (like  PRSPs).  The 
impact  of  these  changes  on  the  orientation  of 
agricultural policy (pro- or anti-small farms) is as 
yet unproven, but there may be opportunities to 
be seized.
Democratization  may  squeeze  opportunities 
for private rent seeking in the long term25 and 
ultimately also strengthen the voice of small-farm 
households simply by virtue of their numbers. The 
long term, however, could be long indeed. In many 
countries, the formal structures of democracy (like 
parliaments  and  parliamentary  elections)  may 
be  instituted  long  before  they  really  become 
the center of power and decisionmaking. In the 
meantime, the need for presidents or ruling groups 
to win regular elections may actually strengthen 
the incentives for the exercise of patronage.
Decentralization also offers promise for more 
effective local support to small farms in the long 
term, although a degree of central control needs 
to be maintained to ensure the continued provision 
of national-level public goods, such as agricultural 
research  investment.  According  to  Foster, 
Brown,  and  Naschold  (2001),  agroecological 
heterogeneity  means  that  solutions  to  many 
agricultural  development  problems  should  be 
sought at a decentralized, rather than a central, 
level. We would add that effective management 
and coordination of agricultural service provision 
can  only  really  occur  at  the  local  level,  where 
much of the relevant information is available for 
holding  frontline  service  providers  accountable 
for  their  performance.  Decentralizing  the 
planning and management of agricultural service 
provision does have major risks. If decentralized 
administrations have too few resources, they will 
be unable to implement local plans and service 
delivery. There is also a danger that decentralized 
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24 Agriculture recently achieved a higher political profile in Africa. In 2003 the Heads of African States of the African Union 
declared that they would allocate up to 10 percent of their fiscal budgets to agriculture by 2008 (the Maputo Declaration), and 
African governments are also working together on the  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). It remains to be seen whether these initiatives will lead to any 
significant increase in investment and policy support for agricultural development and small farms. 
25 This will depend on, among other things, the rules governing party funding under the evolving political dispensations.planning  processes  will  be  captured  by  local 
elites (Bardhan 1996).
In  many  countries  where  small-farm  devel-
opment is important for poverty reduction, par-
ticipatory policy processes are being introduced 
at  a  number  of  levels,  including  economywide 
(like PRSPs), sectoral and subsectoral, and local. 
Multistakeholder  deliberations  on  policy  design 
and  implementation  are  particularly  relevant  to 
the agricultural sector, which has a large number 
of stakeholders, both within government (where 
relevant ministries might include livestock, forestry, 
water resources, roads, and finance, as well as 
agriculture)  and  outside  it  (Foster,  Brown,  and 
Naschold  2001).  In  theory,  involving  a  wide 
range  of  stakeholders  allows  policy  design  to 
draw  on  a  wide  range  of  available  expertise 
and information. Moreover, although pro-reform 
forces are generally weak, they could be strength-
ened  if  policy  “spaces”  are  created  that  give 
nongovernmental  stakeholders  the  right  not  just 
to help formulate policy, but also to hold public 
agencies accountable for their performance. The 
success of such “spaces” is likely to depend partly 
on the extent to which participants use them to 
seek a consensus on ways forward for their sec-
tor  or  subsector,  as  opposed  to  using  them  to 
propagate  and  entrench  conflicting  viewpoints. 
Regular deliberative fora may in themselves help 
to  forge  consensus,  even  where  participants 
begin  with  polarized  views  (Hall  and  Soskice 
2001). The challenge may be greater, however, 
in situations of major inequality (such as when 
unions of peasants and the landless are pitched 
against large landholders or corporate interests in 
Latin America) or when the focus of discussion is 
a staple food system (where local producer and 
consumer interests diverge) rather than an export 
cash crop system.
Reviews of first-generation PRSPs (such as in 
Cromwell  et  al.  2005)  show  that  agriculture—
indeed,  rural  productive  sectors  generally—has 
often been underemphasized in these documents, 
though it is not clear whether responsibility for this 
neglect lies domestically or with donors, whose 
preferences  tend  to  influence  what  is  included 
in the documents. Thus the impact of new policy 
trends on the direction of agricultural policy is as 
yet unproven.
Similarly,  at  the  sectoral  level,  the  current 
consensus is that sectorwide approaches (SWAPs) 
have  yet  to  be  as  effective  in  agriculture  as  in 
social sectors (Foster, Brown, and Naschold 2001). 
Nonetheless,  the  need  to  get  multiple  domestic 
stakeholders  to  work  together  and  to  achieve 
greater  coordination  among  donors  supporting 
the  agricultural  sector  means  that  attempts  to 
evolve more flexible SWAPs will continue.
At  the  subsectoral  level,  multistakeholder 
deliberative fora have made a useful contribution 
to strengthening the performance of the Southern 
and  Eastern  African  cotton  sectors  (Tschirley, 
Poulton, and Boughton forthcoming). Key elements 
of success appear to include the relatively small 
number  of  key  stakeholders  involved  and  the 
reasonable  coincidence  of  interests  across 
stakeholders within export cash-crop systems.
As already noted, there appears to be potential 
to build on ongoing administrative decentralization 
programs  to  establish  participatory,  local 
agricultural development planning processes that 
would respond flexibly to agroecological diversity 
and provide a framework for coordinating service 
providers  in  a  liberalized  market  context.  This 
potential  has  yet  to  be  realized,  however,  not 
least because of the weakness of decentralized 
administrations in many countries.
What  are  the  implications  of  the  foregoing 
discussion  for  those  seeking  to  promote  pro-
smallholder  agricultural  reform  in  developing 
countries?
For  technocratic  elements  within  state 
bureaucracies,  one  implication  would  seem  to 
be  that,  early  in  the  reform  process,  reformers 
should push for the creation of both national and 
local  fora  for  discussions  on  ways  forward  for 
particular  subsectors  or  areas.  As  noted,  these 
fora should also enable private sector, farmers’, 
and NGO representatives to hold public agencies 
accountable for their performance in delivering on 
agreed-upon actions, thus strengthening the voices 
of those pushing for reform outside of government. 
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This  is  particularly  important  in  Africa,  where 
political scientists are pessimistic about the ability 
of other measures to push neopatrimonial political 
systems in a more developmental direction.
Donors  are  more  influential  players  in 
policymaking  in  Africa  than  in  much  of  Asia 
or  Latin  America.  Even  in  Africa,  donors  must 
accept  limitations  to  the  effectiveness  of  their 
pressure when strong, domestic political interests 
are threatened (de Renzio 2006). Nevertheless, 
the  leverage  that  comes  from  providing  40 
percent  of  a  government’s  budget  cannot  be 
entirely  ignored!  Furthermore,  after  a  period 
of  declining  expenditure  on  agriculture  and 
rural development by major donors (and many 
national  governments),  several  donors  show 
welcome  evidence  of  a  commitment  to  reverse 
this  trend  (such  as  the  U.K.  Department  for 
International Development and the Development 
Assistance  Committee  of  the  OECD),  although 
this commitment still needs to be translated into 
action.26 This shift represents a major opportunity 
to encourage more favorable agricultural policies 
in  Africa,  although  the  leverage  that  comes 
from  additional  resources  needs  to  be  used 
wisely.  In  particular,  supply-driven  increases  in 
funding  for  public  sector  agricultural  agencies 
could  undermine  any  incentive  they  have  to 
reform  themselves  or  to  adopt  more  effective, 
pro–small-farm policies. Donors should therefore 
make credible (and coordinated) commitments to 
reward better governance within such agencies 
with additional resources. 
Given  the  importance  of  local  context  in 
defining  appropriate  institutional  arrangements 
to  support  smallholder  agricultural  growth, 
conditionality could center on process, rather than 
on the adoption of particular policy reforms.27 As 
noted, where good process is defined to include 
the  participation  of  private  sector,  farmers’, 
and NGO representatives in setting policy and 
monitoring  implementation,  it  serves  the  dual 
purpose of enabling institutional innovation and 
of strengthening the hand of reform proponents 
within  the  broader  battle  for  pro-smallholder 
agricultural policy. Such principles can be applied 
at both the national level (through, for example, 
SWAPs) and the local level (through competitive 
funding  windows  to  which  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders, including local administrations, are 
eligible to apply).
An  additional  priority  for  donor  funding  in 
the sphere of agricultural and rural development 
is support for farmer organization development. 
Strong  farmer  organizations  are  valuable  for 
service  delivery  and  for  advocacy,  at  both  the 
national and the local level, where they could be 
an important counterweight to the power of local 
elites  in  decentralized  planning  processes.  The 
effectiveness  of  farmer  organizations,  however, 
is  critically  dependent  on  their  own  internal 
governance  and  management.  Significantly 
increasing external funding for such organizations 
could lead to formation of weak organizations, in 
much the same way as it could undermine the 
incentives  for  public  sector  agencies  to  reform 
their organization and management.
Finally,  there  are  debates  over  modalities 
for agricultural support, given that some donors 
have shifted toward direct budget support linked 
to  PRSP  processes.  The  perceived  neglect  of 
agriculture  within  first-generation  PRSPs  has  led 
some to see moves toward greater donor reliance 
on direct budget support as a threat to agriculture, 
26 In Africa, a similar commitment has been made by national governments through the African Union (African Union 2003). 
27 Some (such as Lockwood 2005) argue against conditionality of any kind, suggesting instead that the majority of aid funding 
should be used to reward key development outcomes ex post facto. In his discussant’s comments at the 2005 small farms 
workshop in Wye, Rob Paarlberg argued that funding should reward measurable outcomes in terms of delivery of specific 
rural public goods, such as increases in road density or agricultural research output. This approach would leave the search for 
appropriate institutional arrangements for the delivery of such public goods entirely up to local stakeholders.30
even though some African governments might like 
to  spend  more  on  agriculture  than  their  major 
donors. One domestic reason given for the low 
priority  given  to  agricultural  investment  within 
both PRSPs and national budgets is the technical 
weakness of many ministries of agriculture, which 
reduces their success in getting agricultural issues 
listed as national priorities and in competing for 
scarce  budget  allocations  with  better-organized 
ministries such as health and education.28 Given 
the complexities of agreeing on a reform agenda 
for  the  agricultural  sector,  further  efforts  are 
required  to  develop  sectorwide  approaches 
for  agricultural  reform  as  a  prerequisite  for 
effective participation by ministries of agriculture 
in PRSP production and medium-term expenditure 
framework (MTEF) negotiations.29 
28 Greater agreement between governments and donors about the central role of public delivery of basic health and education 
services makes it easier for these ministries to develop and present a compelling case for funding to ministries of finance. 
29 A counterargument is that the most effective weapon in persuading ministries of agriculture to “get their act in order” is to 
allow their funding to be cut through PRSP and MTEF processes until they are forced to change their attitudes toward reform. 
Given, however, the political impetus to preserve some level of expenditure for ministries of agriculture and the risk that 
coordination failures will prevent a more persuasive “act” from emerging, a more direct approach to capacity building and 
policy development  in agriculture is arguably more appropriate.31
Do small farms have a future in the developing 
world?  This  paper  has  summarized  and  taken 
forward  the  debates  around  the  importance 
of  agriculture,  and  specifically  small  farms,  in 
promoting  growth  and  poverty  reduction  in 
developing countries. Agriculture and small farms 
have  played  a  major  role  in  development  and 
poverty  reduction  in  the  past,  but  changing 
global  conditions  and  donor  policies,  and  the 
characteristics  of  today’s  poor  countries,  are 
widely acknowledged as making this task much 
more difficult now. 
The  paper  develops  a  typology  of  country 
contexts in which the differing roles and needs 
for  small-scale  agricultural  development  are 
considered.  This  typology  helps  clarify  current 
debates regarding (1) the potential for small-farm 
development as a driver of growth and poverty 
reduction and (2) the roles of governments and the 
private sector in promoting such development. 
What  are  the  policy  implications?  Policy 
for  smallholders  needs  to  vary  by  context.  In 
some  cases,  smallholder  development  promises 
to drive or sustain growth as well as to deliver 
reasonably equitable development. In other cases, 
policymakers need to consider whether there are 
social reasons to support small farms. If not, the 
policy  agenda  involves  creating  social  safety 
nets for the poor and facilitating good exits from 
farming for small farmers. 
Looking at smallholder development for growth 
and equity, a contemporary agenda would have 
three central elements, as follows.
One is getting the basics in place. This step 
includes  ensuring  that  the  macroeconomy  is 
stable and that public goods—rural roads, rural 
education and health care, agricultural research 
and extension—are funded by the state. The basics 
also include good governance for agricultural and 
rural development: ensuring the rule of law in the 
countryside; providing opportunities for resolving 
disputes, especially over land; and making any 
public interventions in food and credit markets as 
transparent and predictable as possible.  
The second element is encouraging farmers 
to  follow  demand  and  to  improve  marketing 
systems.  Improving  marketing  systems  so  that 
farmers receive a greater share of market prices 
may  involve  upgrading  transport  infrastructure 
and  systems,  providing  credit  to  traders  and 
processors, and forming farmer associations for 
bulk marketing. 
The  third  element  is  institutional  innovation 
in  the  provision  of  inputs  and  services.  As 
experiences  of  the  past  two  decades  have 
shown only too clearly, markets—however much 
liberalized—often  fail  in  rural  areas.  Too  little 
information  is  available  on  the  intentions  and 
character  of  small  farmers.  It  is  difficult  to 
overcome complementary coordination problems 
in the delivery of input, financial, technical, and 
output  marketing  services  needed  for  small-
farm  intensification.  Institutional  innovations  are 
required  to  overcome  these  failures,  but  who 
will take the initiative? In certain circumstances, 
the  private  sector  has  adequate  incentives  to 
innovate, but in many cases the state must play 
a  key  role  in  coordination.  Yet  state  agencies 
may be unfamiliar with this type of role and ill 
equipped  to  perform  it,  or  they  may  lack  the 
necessary incentives. Greater engagement with, 
and accountability to, other stakeholders (private 
companies, NGOs, and farmer associations) can 
create incentives. Even in the best cases, however, 
5. Conclusions32
one  should  not  expect  a  completely  smooth 
ride,  because  new  roles  must  be  learned,  old 
habits and mistrusts persist, and some institutional 
experiments work better than others.
Even  in  situations  where  this  agenda  is 
relevant,  it  may  not  be  carried  out.  Successful 
intervention on behalf of small farm–led agricultural 
development requires that governments have the 
interest  and  capacity  to  mobilize  the  needed 
support. Political will is a fundamental precondition 
for agricultural investment and policy reform, and 
this  will  has  been  lacking  in  many  of  today’s 
poorest  countries,  particularly  in  Africa.  Even 
in Asian countries that have consistently shown 
strong  political  commitment  to  small  farm–led 
agricultural development, major political economy 
challenges now exist in cutting subsidy support to 
agriculture in the Green Revolution heartlands and 
redirecting some of those resources to investments 
in public goods that can help expand small-farm 
opportunities.  Vested  interests  and  widespread 
opposition  in  rural  areas  have  become  major 
impediments  to  adapting  the  policy  agenda  to 
changing economic conditions. 
In Africa there has been much more government 
rhetoric  about  agricultural  development  over 
the  years  than  actual  commitment,  but  a  new 
emphasis  on  democratization,  decentralization, 
and participatory policy processes (for example, 
PRSPs) has the potential to produce concrete results. 
Whether  these  changes  will  orient  agricultural 
policy toward or away from small farms is as yet 
unproven, but there may be opportunities to be 
seized.
In  conclusion,  the  case  for  smallholder 
development as one of the main ways to reduce 
poverty remains compelling. The policy agenda, 
however, has changed. The challenge is to improve 
the workings of markets for outputs, inputs, and 
financial  services  to  overcome  market  failures. 
Meeting  this  challenge  calls  for  innovations 
in  institutions,  for  joint  work  between  farmers, 
private companies, and NGOs, and for a new, 
more facilitating role for ministries of agriculture 
and other public agencies. New thinking on the 
role of the state in agricultural development, wider 
changes in democratization, decentralization, and 
participatory  policy  processes,  and  a  renewed 
interest in agriculture among major international 
donors  do  present  opportunities  for  greater 
support  to  small-farm  development.  But  unless 
key policymakers adopt a more assertive agenda 
toward small-farm agriculture, there is a growing 
risk that rural poverty could increase dramatically 
and  waves  of  migrants  to  urban  areas  could 
overwhelm  available  job  opportunities,  urban 
infrastructure, and support services.33
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